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IN SICKNESS OR IN HEALTH: THE RIGHT TO MARRY
AND THE CASE OF HIV ANTIBODY TESTING
Robert D. Goodman*
INTRODUCTION
Long before the current public health crisis associated with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and the sexual transmission of the
virus believed to be its cause,' an epidemic of a sexually transmitted disease
instilled a similar sense of crisis in Americans. 2 As a response, public health
agencies implemented mandatory testing of those suspected of carrying
infection3 and mandated quarantines.4 In addition, a majority of states
imposed venereal disease screening as a prerequisite to the issuance of
marriage licenses, and many states specified that licenses could not issue
unless the test results were negative.' When called upon to consider the
constitutionality of any of these measures, including the requirement that
males seeking marriage licenses submit to venereal disease screening, 6 courts
have invariably upheld these requirements.7
* Mr. Goodman is an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton in New York City. He was
awarded the Ann Jennifer Smaldone Memorial Prize for research in the field of legal rights of
the disabled for completing an earlier version of this article.
1. See infra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
2. See generally A. BRANDT, No MAoic BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE
IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 (2d ed. 1987). Dr. Brandt has noted the similarities between
the social, political, and public health responses to AIDS and the earlier response to venereal
disease. See Brandt, A Historical Perspective in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIc
37 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987) [hereinafter Brandt, Historical Perspective]; Brandt, AIDS
in Historical Perspective: Four Lessons from the History of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 78
Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 367 (1988) [hereinafter Brandt, Four Lessons).
3. See People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441 (1944).
4. See Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943); Exparte Arata, 52 Cal. App.
380, 198 P. 814 (1921).
5. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DomEsTic RELATIONS IN TE UNITED STATES § 2.3, at 89
(1988).
6. See, e.g., Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914).
7. For a discussion of the courts' historically deferential treatment of public health regu-
lations, see generally Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739, 754-83 (1986). See also Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival
of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HoFsTRA L. REv. 53, 59-69 (1985) (state authority to quarantine
individuals for protection of the public health was assumed to be a proper exercise of police
power); Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1274, 1276-79
(1986) [hereinafter Note, AIDS Carriers) (large scale quarantine no longer justified because
both society and courts rely on medical knowledge rather than fear to determine the necessity
of public health actions).
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These cases preceded revolutions in both constitutional jurisprudence and
medical and scientific knowledge.' Some commentators have expressed the
view that legislation conditioning the issuance of a marriage license on a
negative test for exposure to the virus associated with AIDS would now be
held unconstitutional. 9 While the United States Supreme Court's protection
of a constitutional "right to marry'" 0 suggests such a result, the ambiguities
and contradictions in the caselaw surrounding that right counsel caution."
This Article uses the case of premarital HIV testing to explore the meaning
and scope of the right to marry. Part I considers the development of the
right to marry in the United States Supreme Court. Part II presents basic
information concerning AIDS and the transmission of the virus associated
with the disease. Part III considers the constitutionality of premarital testing
statutes under the right to marry. The final section will explore three related
questions: first, whether testing alone should trigger heightened constitutional
scrutiny; second, whether such screening can be justified under heightened
scrutiny, and; finally, whether those individuals, who have been determined
to carry HIV infection, nonetheless qualify for protection under the right to
marry.
I. TIE DEVELOPMENT OF A RIGHT To MARRY
The Supreme Court has declared that marriage is "one of the 'basic civil
rights of man."''12 Because of this, commentators have surmised that a wide
range of statutory restrictions on the freedom to marry may be unconstitu-
tional. 3 This development is a striking one, 14 challenging, at a fundamental
level, the historical conception that societal interests, as well as the interests
8. See Parmet, supra note 7, at 54-55; Note, AIDS Carriers, supra note 7, at 1277. A
number of more modern courts have continued, however, to apply these deferential public
health precedents. See, e.g., Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973); City of
New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d 911 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
9. See Closen, Connor, Kaufman & Wojcik, AIDS: Testing Democracy-Irrational Res-
ponses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 198 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 835, 907 (1986) [hereinafter Closen, Testing Democracy].
10. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1%7).
11. It has been observed that the Supreme Court's "right to marry" cases were "unlikely
to be the final word of the Court or to present the definitive answers as to the parameters of
the fundamental right to marry." Note. Califano v. Jobst, Zablocki v. Redhail, and the
Fundamental Right to Marry, 18 J. FAM. L. 587, 613 (1979-80) [hereinafter Note, Fundamental
Right].
12. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
13. See, e.g., Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. L.J.
358, 369-76 (1968); Foster, Marriage: A "Basic Civil Right of Man," 37 FoRDHAm L. REv. 51,
56-79 (1968); Note Constitutional Law-Family Law-Right to Marry Deemed Fundamental
Right, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 682, 697-704 [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Law].
14. For an argument that the development of a fundamental right to marry was a dramatic
departure from the Court's prior domestic relations jurisprudence and an unwarranted extension
of the right to privacy, see Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 397-99 (Powell, J., concurring).
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of the individuals involved, should shape the status of marriage."'
In Zablocki v. Redhail,16 the Court held, for the first time, that statutes
significantly interfering with the decision to marry required a high degree of
justification to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 7 The majority noted that
"[]ong ago, in Maynard v. Hill, the Court characterized marriage as 'the
most important relation in life,' and as 'the foundation of the family and
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.""'
The reliance on Maynard, an 1888 case which held that the granting of a
divorce was a proper legislative function, was somewhat ironic' 9 as is clear
when one of the quotations from Maynard is returned to its context. Rather
than indicating that regulation of marriage was ordinarily beyond the reach
of legislative bodies, the Court suggested the reverse:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to.do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution,
has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body
prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure
or form essential to constitute a marriage, the duties and obligations it
creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospec-
tive, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.3°
Zablocki relied on the Maynard Court's recognition of the importance of
marriage to society in order to derive a fundamental right to marry. However,
in holding that the fundamental nature of the right rendered statutory
restrictions to some degree suspect, the Zablocki Court ignored Maynard's
obvious message that it is the importance of marriage itself that justifies
state control over the decision to marry. 2' Such a theory seems to have
played a part in the Supreme Court's 1878 ruling in Reynolds v. United
States," upholding the constitutionality of prosecutions for bigamy: 23
15. See Foster, supra note 13, at 52-53. The author notes that in a wide variety of cultures,
"marriage and divorce are major events seized upon for rituals, for the transfer of wealth, and
for various social and legal consequences." Id. at 52.
16. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
17. See id. at 388. Prior to Zablocki, the Court had declared that the decision to marry
could not be interfered with "on so insupportable a basis" as racial discrimination. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
18. 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888)) (citations
omitted).
19. In Loving, the Court had cited Maynard for the proposition that "marriage is a social
relation subject to the State's police power." 388 U.S. at 7.
20. 125 U.S. at 205.
21. Stating the analysis more explicitly, the Washington Supreme Court observed that
because marriage is "so closely and thoroughly related to the state," it "should be most
carefully guarded." Thus, the court continued, "improvident and improper marriages should
be prevented." In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 591, 30 P. 651, 658 (1892). See also
Pry v. Pry, 225 Ind. 458, 468, 75 N.E.2d 909, 913 (1947) (significance of the marital relationship
itself makes it subject to legislative control).
22. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
23. The narrow holding of Reynolds was that while the free exercise clause protects religious
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Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless,
in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and is usually regulated by law.
Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social
relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is
necessarily required to deal. 2'
The right to marry was not, however, "drawn from the blue. ' 25 The
common law doctrine of family privacy, 6 dating back to the medieval
period,r held that courts should not "regulate by [their] processes the internal
affairs of the home." 2 The doctrine was marked by a reluctance to inter-
meddle in the relationship between parents or between parent and child.2
9
Courts typically refused to entertain tort actions by one spouse against
another,30 to intervene between a battering husband and his wife," or to
receive the testimony of one spouse offered against the other.
3 2
opinion absolutely, it does not insulate conduct from criminal prosecution merely because it is
religiously motivated. See id. at 164-67. For a discussion of Reynolds and the Supreme Court's
other polygamy cases in light of the fundamental right to marry, see infra notes 255 & 263-65
and accompanying text.
24. 98 U.S. at 165.
25. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Poe, Justice
Douglas argued that the "notion of privacy is not drawn from the blue," but rather "emanates
from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live." Id.
26. See J. AREEN, CASES AND MATEAJAS ON FAMILY LAw 65-69 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing
McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. 1953)). It may be more accurate,
however, to conceive of this doctrine in terms of "family unity" rather than "family privacy."
See generally Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U.
FIA. L. REV. 627, 631-34 (1987). While the "value placed on family unity meant that courts
were reluctant to intervene in family affairs on behalf of individuals," id. at 631, the state
could restrict access to marriage in order to "create more permanent unions," id. at 633, and
enact statutes promoting childbirth by prohibiting contraception and abortion. See id. at 632.
As social conservatives argue with respect to the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases, the
availability of abortion and contraceptives disrupts "an intricate set of social relationships
between men and women that has traditionally surrounded ... women and children." K.
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 162 (1984).
27. See Rutherford, supra note 26, at 631.
28. People ex. rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 287, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1936) (per
curiam). The doctrine produced some curious anomalies. For instance, even though the common
law recognized an obligation on the part of a husband to financially support his wife, see, e.g.,
Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938 (E.D. Mich. 1940), the family privacy doctrine meant
that courts would not enforce the obligation while the wife remained in the marital relationship.
See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
29. See, e.g., Sisson, 271 N.Y. at 287-88, 2 N.E.2d at 661. In Sisson, the judge refused to
terminate a father's right of joint parental control with his child's mother, despite a disagreement
between the parents concerning the child's education. The court explained:
The vast majority of matters concerning the upbringing of children must be left to
the conscience, patience and self restraint of father and mother. No end of diffi-
culties would arise should judges try to tell parents how to bring up their children.
Only when moral, mental, and physical conditions are so bad as seriously to affect
the health or morals of children should the courts be called upon to act.
Id.
30. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAuv. L. REV. 1030,
1033-35 (1930).
31. See State v. Rhodes, 62 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868).
32. See E. COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON *6b.
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When the.Supreme Court began to expansively read the concept of "lib-
erty" in the fourteenth amendment due process clause to impose substantive
restraints on the content of state legislation,3 the Court relied on common
law principles34 to include within "liberty" the rights of parents to control
the education and upbringing of their children.3 Even after the Supreme
Court rejected 6 those cases which had invoked a due process "liberty of
contract" to invalidate economic or industrial regulation, 7 the Court con-
tinued to suggest that family decision-making involved "basic civil rights,"38
and there was a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." '39
In 1965, the Court relied on the earlier substantive due process cases*° to
invalidate a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 4' That decision,
Griswold v. Connecticut,42 extravagantly praised the marital relationship 43
and declared that the relationship lay "within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."" The Griswold privacy
33. See L. TRmE, AMER cAN CONSTrrUTOAL. LAW ch. 8 (2d ed. 1988).
34. See E. RuBiN, THE SUPREME COURT AND TiE AmurucAN F~mny 16 (1986).
35. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parental authority over child
rearing undermined by mandatory public education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(parental authority over child rearing undermined by prohibition against teaching of foreign
language in school). In dicta, the Meyer Court also stated that due process liberty includes
"the right of the individual ... to marry." Id. at 399. It is probably to this language that the
Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) referred when it cited Meyer for the proposition
that the state's power to regulate marriage is limited by the fourteenth amendment. See Drinan,
supra note 13, at 361-62.
36. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), is commonly viewed as heralding
the end of economic substantive due process. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34, 36-37.
37. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York statute
setting maximum hours for bakery workers).
38. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
39. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
40. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
41. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 486.
44. Id. at 485. Although the opinion of the Court in Griswold relies on a concept of
"penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of the Rights to explain the derivation of a
constitutional right to privacy, see id. at 484, it is clear from an examination of the concurring
opinions in the case, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J., & Brennan,
J.), id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring), and id. at 502 (White, J., concurring), that a five
justice majority in Griswold holds that the right to privacy is an aspect of substantive due
process. See Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of
Lochner, 61 WAs,. L. REv. 293, 308-09 (1986); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations,
Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235, 249-
50 (1965). The substantive due process approach was adopted in majority opinions in post-
Griswold cases developing the right to privacy. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 n.23
(1977). But cf. Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at Sodom: Gays and Privacy, 18 COLUM. Hum. RTS.
L. Rav. 43 (1987) (arguing against substantive due process approach and in favor of theory
that the right to privacy exists by virtue of the interplay of the equal protection clause, the
ninth amendment, and the Bill of Rights).
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doctrine may be read in two ways: (1) to encompass a right to enter into
the marriage relationship without governmental interference; 45 (2) to apply
only to the regulation of intimate decision-making within an already existing
marriage.4 While the Zablocki Court used the first reading of Griswold as
support for a "right to marry," 41 the latter reading is consistent with the
fact that the common law family privacy doctrine and a range of state-
imposed rules governing the formation and dissolution of marriage had long
existed side by side.48
Soon after Griswold, the Supreme Court again considered the constitu-
tional status of the marriage relationship. In the 1967 case of Loving v.
Virginia4 9 the Court struck down a state miscegenation statute. In Loving,
the Court called marriage a "fundamental freedom," 50 which it said had
"long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." s The statements were arguably
dicta52 because the racist motivation of Virginia's statute alone could have
sufficed to invalidate the law." However, the Court chose to rely on both
the conclusion that this racist motivation violated the equal protection clause
54
and the view that the statute's interference with the right to marry was a
violation of the due process clause.5 Nonetheless, it was the same racist
purpose that the Court held was offensive to equal protection principles that
the Court relied on to arrive at its holding that the petitioners' due process
45. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, at § 2.2, at 83.
46. See id. See also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that
cases cited in the majority opinion do not necessarily suggest that there is the same sphere of
privacy for entering into and dissolving a marriage as there is for one that already exists). It
bears noting that in Justice Harlan's influential dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961), which he "incorporated by reference" in his concurrence in Griswold, 381 U.S. at
500, Harlan drew just this distinction: "It is one thing when the state exerts its power . . . to
say who may marry, but is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the
intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of
that intimacy." 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. See 434 U.S. at 384.
48. See E. RutmN, supra note 34, at 17.
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id.
52. See Drinan, supra note 13, at 359; Note, Fundamental Right, supra note 11, at 592.
53. See Drinan, supra note 13, at 358-59. The Loving Court squarely met the argument
that the equal protection clause did not demand the invalidation of the Virginia law because
the statute treated blacks and whites identically, stating that "[tihe fact that Virginia prohibits
only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications
must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy."
388 U.S. at II. As Professor Tribe has noted, the Court had already disposed of the argument
that "apparent symmetry in treatment" ensured anything more than "a shallow illusion of
equality" in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See L. TRIE, supra note 33, §
16-15, at 1475.
54. See 388 U.S. at 11-12.
55. See id. at 12.
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right to marry was infringed. 6 The Court stated that "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted
by invidious racial discriminations ' 5 7 or "on so insupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes." 58 The Court made no
attempt to set forth any justifications, other than white supremacy, that
would also fail to satisfy the demands of due process,5 9 and at least one
state supreme court has subsequently read Loving as limited to racial dis-
crimination. 60 It is certainly true that Loving "does not speak to the level
of judicial scrutiny of, or governmental justification for restrictions on, the
'fundamental freedom' of individuals to marry." 61
56. See Note, Fundamental Right, supra note 11, at 593-94.
57. 388 U.S. at 12.
58. Id.
59. See Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 13, at 686.
60. See In re Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 29, 30 n.6, 512 P.2d 1028, 1029, 1030 n.6 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1148 (1974). Goalen is noteworthy for its vituperative denunciation
of a constitutionally protected right to marry:
When and if the Supreme Court of the United States says the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees an unrestricted right for two persons of any character or
status to marry-the 50 states to take it lying down-simply because citizens or
resident aliens or felons, or syphilitics, etc. profess to have unlimited civil rights,
and that a felon has the same constitutional right to marry, and perhaps become a
behind-bars father without any semblance of parental control,-which also would
deny to the states a right to prevent a couple of homosexuals, for example, from
marrying, or condone the switch of wives by swingers, this country then will have
switched to legalized indiscriminate sex proclivities with a consequent rising incidence
of disease, poverty, and indolence,-but worse, to subject unwary citizens to the
whim and caprice of the federal establishment,-not states,-leading to a substi-
tution of a bit of judicial legislation for plain ordinary, horse sense. It isn't difficult
to conclude that this may be giving a warranted and undebatable kudo to the horse.
We agree that marriage is "fundamental." We believe that like motherhood and
the Boy Scouts, it is an institution, a status, an entente, if you please, with reality,
and with whatever man's own religion says it is,-because all of these are universal
precepts. However, this does not mean that the Constitution of the United States,
which in no uncertain terms says the states are supreme in this country and superior
to the philosophy of federal protagonists who deign to suggest a coterie of 3 or 5
or even 9 federal persons immune from public intolerance, by use of a pair of
scissors and the whorl of a 10 [cent] ball-point pen, and a false sense of last-minute
confessional importance, can in one fell swoop, shakily clip phrases out of the
Constitution, substitute their manufactured voids with Scotch-taped rhetoric, and
thus reverse hundreds of cases dimmed only by time and nature, but whose
impressions indestructibly already indelibly had been linotyped on the minds of kids
and grandkids who vowed and now would or will vow to defend, not only the
institution of marriage and motherhood, but to reserve to the states a full budget
of legitimate, time-tested mores incident to that doctorate.
Id. at 29.30 (footnote omitted). The Goalen court apparently drew support for its narrow view
of the federal judiciary's role in the protection of fundamental rights from the tenth amendment.
See id. at 28, 29, 31.
61. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
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Even though Loving may arguably be restricted to cases of racial discrim-
ination, the Court has repeatedly relied upon the case as support for decisions
expanding the "right to privacy" announced in Griswold.62 By the time
Zablocki v. Redhail was decided in 1978, the Supreme Court simply observed
that "the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance
as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, childrearing, and family
relationships. ' 61 Having determined the right to marry to be "a fundamental
right," 64 the Court found that a statute substantially interfering with the
decision to marry "cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests." 6 Undoubtedly cognizant of the potential reach of such a fun-
damental rights approach to marriage, 66 the Court, however, insisted as
follows:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way
to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship
may legitimately be imposed.6'
62. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). The
meaning of these cases' citations to Loving is not absolutely clear, however. As Professor Tribe
has commented, "passing references to marginally relevant cases should not always be assumed
to have been carefully examined by all the concurring Justices." L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 5-
14, at 345 n.65.
63. 434 U.S. at 386.
64. See id. at 383.
65. Id. at 388 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 686; Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 262-63 (1974); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973);
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972)). Perhaps, because the Court was "understandably
reluctant to rely on substantive due process," 434 U.S. at 395 (Stewart, J., concurring), Zablocki
focused on the fact that the statute at issue, prohibiting residents under child support orders
from marrying without a court determination that the support obligation had been met, created
a "class of ... residents [who) may not marry ...without first obtaining a court order
granting permission to marry," id. at 375 (emphasis added), and subjected that classification
to analysis under the equal protection clause. Id. at 383. However, the Court's "equal protec-
tion" analysis was essentially identical to the inquiry under the due process clause, see id. at
395-96 (Stewart, J., concurring), and it is not apparent that by choosing to invoke equal
protection rather than due process, the Zablocki Court narrowed the reach of its decision, since
"almost any law . . . affects some people and does not affect others." Id. at 391 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). A premarital HIV testing statute, for instance, could be subject to equal protection
scrutiny merely because it imposes testing only on those individuals who seek marriage licenses
and not on others. For a criticism of the use of the equal protection clause to enforce substantive
rights, see generally Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 981 (1979).
66. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 2.3 (description of the range of marriage
licensing and solemnization requirements imposed by the states).
67. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (citation omitted).
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While the Court's distinction between "significant interference" and "rea-
sonable regulation" is somewhat obscure,61 its failure to provide a persuasive
theory of why the freedom to marry should be a fundamental right is even
more dissatisfying.6 It is likely that application of the right to marry to
statutes which impose premarital testing for exposure to the virus associated
with AIDS would require grappling both with the meaning of this distinction
and the meaning of the right to marry itself.
II. AIDS AND THE TRAsSBnssIoN OF HIV
AIDS is regarded as the most advanced manifestation"0 of a viral infection
now carried by up to two million Americans. 7' Human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV)72, discovered in 1983," is believed to be the major, or sole,
68. Justice Powell stated that the Court did not provide "any principled means for distin-
guishing between the two types of regulations." Id. at 396 (concurring opinion). For an
examination of the possible content of the distinction, see infra notes 113-82 and accompanying
text.
69. The rationale the Court does provide consists mostly of the assertion that "a decision
to marry and raise [a] child in a traditional family setting" must receive protection equivalent
to that accorded the "fundamental right to seek an abortion" or the decision "to bring the
child into life to suffer the myriad ... disabilities that the status of illegitimacy brings," id.
at 386, without, however, providing an analysis of why each of these decisions is of constitutional
significance. Cf. Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STA. L. REv. 1161,
1174 (1974) (criticizing the privacy cases' "catalog approach"). The Court also stated that if
the right to procreate is to be meaningful, "it must imply some right to enter the only relationship
in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place." 434 U.S. at 386.
This latter explanation strikes one as somewhat disingenuous, however, given that the author
of the Zablocki opinion, Justice Marshall, apparently does not believe that such a limitation
itself is constitutional. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217-18 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). Cf Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439
U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978) (right
of state library to dismiss employees for adulterous cohabitation).
70. The official surveillance definition of AIDS now runs to 15 pages. See Revision of the
CDC Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS, 36 MoRBwrry & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (Supp.
No. I Aug. 14, 1987). AIDS-associated disease short of this reporting definition is sometimes
called AIDS-related complex or ARC, see, e.g., Redfield, Markham, Salahuddin, Wright,
Sarngadharan & Gallo, Heterosexually Acquired HTL V-111/LA V Disease (AIDS-Related Com-
plex and AIDS), 254 J. A.M.A. 2094, 2094 (Oct. 1985), although the Center for Disease
Control has formulated a more complicated classification system for AIDS-related conditions
in adults, Classification System for HTL V-Ill/LA V Infections, 35 MoRBrrY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 334, 335-37 (1986), and in children, Classfication System for Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus (HIV) Infection in Children Under 13 Years of Age, 36 MORIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 225, 227-29 (1987).
71. Estimates of the number of infected individuals vary. Compare Public Health Service
Guidelines for Counselling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infections and AIDS, 36
MoRamrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 509, 509 (1987) (1 to 1.5 million) with Kessler, Blaauw,
Spear, Paul, Falk & Landay, Diagnosis of HIV Infection in Seronegative Homosexuals Pre-
senting with an Acute Viral Syndrome, 258 J. A.M.A. 1196, 1199 (Sept. 1987) (2 million).
72. The widespread adoption of the name HIV followed the resolution of a patent dispute
between the National Cancer Institute in the United States and the Pasteur Institute in France.
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cause of AIDS.74 HIV is transmitted perinatally, through the infusion or
inoculation of blood, and through certain sexual activity.7 The period
between exposure to the virus and the onset of clinical manifestations may
be several years 7 6 with some infected individuals perhaps never developing
the disease.
77
Although AIDS initially appeared in this country in homosexual men,78
the heterosexual partners of infected individuals have since been identified
as being at risk of developing AIDS.7 9 It is now well-established that HIV
can be transmitted from males to females through sexual intercourse.80
However, the risk of infection in any one, unprotected, sexual encounter
with an infected male may be as low as one in 500.81 As for transmission
See generally Gallo & Montagnier, The Chronology of AIDS Research, 326 NATURE 435, 435
(1987) (brief history of critical published facts on discovery and demonstration of AIDS as
retroviral disease). Earlier names for HIV included HTLV-III (human T-cell lymphotropic
virus), LAV (lymphadenopathy-associated virus) and ARV (AIDS-related virus).
73. See Barre-Sinoussi, Chermann, Rey, Nugeyre, Chamaret, Gruest, Daguet, Axler-Blin,
Vezinet-Brun, Rouzioux, Rozenbaum & Montagnier, Isolation of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus
from a patient at Risk for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 Sci. 868 (1983)
(reporting isolation of retrovirus belonging to recently discovered HTLV distinct from previous
isolates).
74. For discussions of the possibility that there are co-factors for AIDS, see, e.g., Con-
fronting AIDS: Directions for Public Health, Health Care and Research 39 CoMMIaTEE ON A
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR AIDS, INsTIrTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCEtNCES (1986)
[hereinafter Confronting AIDS); Gabuzda & Hirsch, Neurologic Manifestations of Infection
with HIV: Clinical Features and Pathogenesis, 107 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 383, 387-88 (1987);
Gallo, The AIDS Virus (pt. 2), Sci. AM. 46 (Jan. 1987); Gluckman, Klatzmann & Montagnier,
LA V Intfection and AIDS, 4 ANN. REV. IMMUNOLOGY 97 (1986). A small minority in the
scientific community doubt that HIV has any role in causing AIDS. See Duesberg, Retroviruses
as Carcinogens and Pathogens: Expectations and Reality, 47 CANCER Ras. 1199, 1212-15 (1987)
(virus not sufficient to cause AIDS and does not encode AIDS-specific function); Volsky, Sakai,
Stevenson & Dewhurst, Retroviral Etiology of AIDS, 2 AIDS RES. 35 (Supp. 1 1986).
75. See Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1125 (1987).
76. See, e.g., Peterman, Drotman & Curran, Epidemiology of the Acquired Immunodefi-
ciency Syndrome, (AIDS), 7 EPIDEMIOLOGY REV. I, 1, 3-4 (1985); Update: AIDS-United States,
35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17, 20 (Jan. 1986).
77. It has been estimated that a significant number of HIV-infected individuals will develop
AIDS within five to ten years, with another sizeable group developing a disease short of AIDS.
See, e.g., Carne, Weller, Loveday & Adler, From Persistent Generalized Lymphadenopathy to
AIDS: Who Will Progress?, 294 BRIT. MED. J. 868 (1987).
78. See, e.g., A Cluster of Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia Among
Homosexual Residents of Los Angeles and Orange Counties, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 305 (1982).
79. See DeJarlais, Chamberland, Yancovitz, Weinberg & Freidman, Heterosexual Partners:
A Large Risk Group for AIDS, II THE LANCET 1346 (Dec. 8, 1984); Ragni, Rinaldo, Kingsley,
Steffensen, Bowman, Spero & Lewis, Heterosexual Partners of Hemophiliacs Must Refrain
from Blood Donation, I THE LANCET 1033 (May 3, 1986).
80. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 75, at 1128.
81. See Hearst & Hulley, Preventing the Heterosexual Spread of AIDS, 259 J. A.M.A.
2428, 2429 (1988) (assuming infected male is not using condoms). It may be, however, that
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from females to males, HIV has been isolated from cervical secretions,82 and
African test data is at least suggestive of efficient female-to-male transmis-
sion.83 American studies, however, indicate that female-to-male transmission
in this country is very rare.Y The African statistics may be partially explain-
able by other factors, such as the African practice of female circumcision,
which greatly increases the chance of laceration of the tissue surrounding
the scarring,ss and the use of contaminated needles in the treatment of
sexually transmitted diseases.8 6 Another possible explanation for the seem-
ingly more common, bi-directional transmission of HIV in Africa is that
homosexual acts have actually played a significant role in the transmission
to males but, nonetheless, have been denied because of strong social taboos.
87
It is clear, however, that not all forms of sexual activity carry a significant
risk of transmission of HIV. While only a "mutually monogamous relation-
ship" between uninfected partners is "absolutely safe," it appears that
"noninsertive sexual relations," such as mutual masturbation, can be re-
garded as "extremely safe." 88 Because it is generally believed that the ex-
change of saliva is not a means of transmitting the virus, intimate kissing is
anal intercourse more efficiently transmits HIV from men to women than does vaginal inter-
course. See id.; Friedland & Klein, supra note 75, at 1129. It may also be that there are some
HIV-infected individuals with an infectivity much higher than average. See Peterman, Stone-
burner, Allen, Jaffe & Curran, Risk of HIV Transmission from Heterosexual Adults with
Transfusion-Associated Infections, 259 J. A.M.A. 55 (Jan. 1988).
82. See Archibald, Witt, Craven, Vogt, Hirsch & Essex, Antibodies to HIV in cervical
secretions from women at risk for AIDS, 156 J. INscnous DISEASE 240 (1987); Blaser, Isolation
of HIVfrom Cervical Secretions During Menses, Letter to the Editor, 106 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 912 (1987).
83. See Peterman & Curran, Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 256
J. A.M.A. 2222, 2224-25 (Oct. 1985); .Piot, Taelman, Minlangu, Mbendi, Ndangi, kalambayi,
Bridts, Quinn, Feinsod, Wobin, Mazebo, Stevens, Mitchell & McCormick, Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome in a Heterosexual Population in Zaire, II THE LANCET 65, 68 (July 14,
1984); Quinn, Mann, Curran & Piot, AIDS in Africa: An Epidemiologic Paradigm, 234 Sci.
955, 958 (1986); Van de Perre, Le Page, Kestelyn, Hekker, Rouvroy, Bogaerts, Kayihigi, Butzler
& Clumeck, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Rwanda, I THE LANCET 62, 65 (July
14, 1984).
84. See, e.g., Schultz, Milberg, Kristal & Stoneburner, Female-to-Male Transmission of
HTLV-Ill, Letter to the Editor, 255 J. A.M.A. 1703, 1703 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter Schultz].
85. See Linke, AIDS in Africa, Letter to the Editor, 231 Scl. 203, 203 (1986); Manners,
African Practices May Offer Insights on AIDS, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
1985, at A34 (city ed.).
86. See Polk, Female-to-Male Transmission of AIDS, Letter to the Editor, 254 J. A.M.A.
3177, 3178 (Dec. 1985); Schultz, supra note 84, at 1704; Wykoff, Female-to-Male Transmission
of HTLV-IlI, Letter to the Editor, 255 J. A.M.A. 1704, 1704 (Apr. 1986).
87. See Biggar, The AIDS Problem in Africa, I THE LANCET 79, 81 (Jan. 11, 1986) (most
Africans adamantly deny homosexual activity); James, Hidden Homosexuality, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 22, 1985, at A34 (city ed.) (men or women without children are shamed and regarded as
outcasts by the African Society).
88. Francis & Chin, The Prevention of AIDS in the United States, 257 J. A.M.A. 1357,
1360 (Mar. 1987).
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not a high risk activity.89 Even oral sex practiced without a condom appears
to be a much less efficient mode of transmission of HIV than either rectal
or vaginal intercourse,1° perhaps because saliva itself may contain substances
that prevent the virus from infecting white blood cells. 9'
There is somewhat more uncertainty as to the safety of vaginal or rectal
intercourse when a latex condom is used. While some in the medical com-
munity are willing to call such sexual activity "very safe," 92 others would
sharply dispute this characterization.93 Since HIV can not penetrate latex,
proper use of undamaged condoms will prevent transmission of the virus.9 4
In addition, nonoxynol-9, a spermicide used as a coating on some condoms,
has been shown to destroy HIV.9s Nevertheless, the improper or intermittent
use of condoms, as well as the possibility of breakage, make condom use
less than 100 percent safe. It is generally estimated that such problems lead
to the failure of condoms as a birth control device at a rate of approximately
10 percent per year.9
89. See Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 6 (Supp. 2 Aug. 21, 1987); Adler, Development of the
Epidemic. 294 BRIT. MED. J. 1083, 1084 (1987); Drummond, Seronegative 18 Months After
Being Bitten By A Patient With AIDS, Letter to the Editor, 256 J. A.M.A. 2342 (Nov. 1986);
Smith, HIV Transmitted by Sexual Intercourse but not by Kissing, 294 BRIr. MED. J. 446
(1987). The courts have apparently accepted the proposition that saliva is not a mode of HIV
transmission. See Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 404, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325, 330 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
90. See, e.g., Winkelstein, Lyman, Padian, Grant, Samuel, Wiley, Anderson, Lang, Riggs
& Levy, Sexual Practices and Risk of Infection by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus: The
San Francisco Men's Health Study, 257 J. A.M.A. 321, 323 (Jan. 1987). But cf. City of New
York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d 911, 917, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(refusing to find city health regulation prohibiting certain sexual activities in commercial
establishments unconstitutionally overbroad for barring acts of fellatio).
91. See Fox, Wolff, Chik-Ko Yek, Atkinson & Baum, Saliva Inhibits HIV-I Infectivity,
116 J. A.D.A. 635 (May 1988); Kolata, Saliva May Hinder AIDS Transmission, N.Y. Times,
May 6, 1988, at A16.
92. See Francis & Chin, supra note 88, at 1360.
93. See, e.g., Hearst & Hurley, supra note 81, at 2431.
94. See Conant, Hardy, Sernatinger, Spicer & Levy, Condoms Prevent Transmission of
AIDS-Associated Retrovirus, 255 J. A.M.A. 1706 (1986); Goldsmith, Sex in the Age of AIDS
Calls for Common Sense and "Condom Sense, " 257 J. A.M.A. 2261 (1987); Mann, Quinn,
Piot, Bosenge, Nzilombi, Francis, Colebunders, Byers, Azila, Kabeya & Curran, Condom Use
and HIV Infection Among Prostitutes in Zaire, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 345 (1987).
95. See Hicks, Martin, Gretchell, Heath, Francis, McDougal, Curran & Voeller, Inactivation
of 2HTL V-Ill/LA V-infected cultures of normal human lymphocytes by nonoxynol-9 in vitro,
11 THE LANCET 1422 (Dec. 21, 1985).
96. See CONTRACEPTrVE TECHNOLOGY 1986-1987 36 (N. Williams ed. 1986). Some studies
have shown better results. See, e.g., Peel, The Hull Family Survey: II; Family Planning in the
First Five Years of Marriage, 4 J. BiosociL. Sct. 333 (1972). Some medical writers have assumed
a "condom failure rate" for the purposes of preventing HIV infection of 10 percent per
encounter, see, e.g., Hearst & Hulley, supra note 81, at 2431, leading to the conclusion that a
woman who engages in sexual intercourse with a seropositive male 500 times, using condoms,
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY PREMARITAL HIV ANTIBODY
TESTING
Often manifesting itself in irrational and ugly forms, 97 fear of AIDS is
widespread and powerful. 9 The need to respond to that fear has led to a
wide variety of proposals for changes in the law. 99 In addition to those
measures specifically regulating the marriage relation, other proposals have
included: 1) calls for the quarantine of infected individuals;' °° 2) mass testing
for infection;' 0' 3) registries of those individuals testing positive; 02 4) the
nonetheless has a I in 11 chance of becoming infected. For a discussion of opposition to the
concept of "safe sex" within the medical community, see generally Patton, Resistance and the
Erotic, 20 RADicAL Am. 68, 69-72 (1987).
97. See, e.g., Cronon v. New Eng. Tel. and Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1268 (D. Mass. Apr. 11, 1986) (coworkers of man diagnosed with ARC threatened to lynch
him if he returned to work). See also Winership, Nimby [Not In My Backyard] Views on
People with AIDS, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1988, at BI (residents and leaders gathered on Good
Friday to stop the state from moving 120 AIDS patients to a nursing home in Wanague, New
Jersey); Nordheimer, To Neighbors of Shunned Family, AIDS Fear Outweighs Sympathy, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1987, at Al, col. I (townspeople fought to keep three boys with AIDS from
attending school; family's house was suspiciously burned down and family was forced to leave
town); AIDS Fear Forced Pupils Out, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1985, at BI, col. 4 (three children
were removed from school by community school district superintendents because of suspicions
that their mother's boyfriend had AIDS).
Public fears concerning AIDS have also taken the form of high levels of support for the
quarantine of people with AIDS, see Growing Concern, Greater Precautions, Newsweek, Nov.
24, 1986, at 32 (54 percent of those surveyed favored quarantine); Poll Indicates Majority
Favor Quarantine of AIDS Victims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1985, at A24, col. 1. See also
Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired Immunodefi-
ciency Syndrome-AIDS, 37 EMORY L.J. 217, 228-29 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Constitu-
tional Implications] (concerning November 1986 referendum in California on an AIDS quarantine
measure proposed by right-wing activist Lyndon LaRouche). This is despite the strong medical
consensus that HIV cannot be spread through casual contact with people with AIDS or HIV
infection. See sources collected in Sullivan & Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State,
23 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 141 n.3 (1988).
98. It has been observed that AIDS now rivals cancer as the most feared disease in America.
See Fear of AIDS Rivals Worry Over Cancer, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, at C3.
99. At times, political figures have candidly admitted that even unsubstantiated public fear
may motivate such proposals. See Note, AIDS Carriers, supra note 6, at 1274 n.6 (Newark,
New Jersey city council president stated that although there is no proof that AIDS can be
transmitted by food workers, screening food workers for infection would give "some people a
psychological lift"). A number of commentators have observed that it is likely that irrational
fears will influence AIDS policy. See Brandt, Four Lessons, supra note 2, at 367-68; Dolgin,
AIDS: Social Meanings and Legal Ramifications, 14 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 193 (1985).
100. See Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR
THE Puauc 59-62 (H. Dalton & S. Borris eds. 1987); Merritt, supra note 7, at 774-83; Sullivan
& Field, supra note 97, at 143-56.
101. See, e.g., Altman, U.S. Considering Much Wider Tests for AIDS Infection, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 1987, at Al. Earlier proposals for mass testing are collected in Closen, Testing
Democracy, supra note 9, at 837 n.2. There has even been a proposal for mandatory testing
of the entire United States population. See Duncan. Public Policy and the AIDS Epidemic, 2
J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 169 (1986).
102. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 9, at 910-12.
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tracing of sexual contacts of infected individuals;"' and 5) imposition of
criminal liability on infected individuals who continue to engage in sexual
activity. ,04
This section will consider the constitutionality of proposals for mandatory
premarital testing for exposure to HIV under the fundamental right to
marry.1OS Such proposals are currently pending before a large majority of
103. See id. at 917-18 n.365.
104. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 97, at 139 n.l. Enacted and pending state legislation
criminalizing such sexual activity is collected in id. at 158-59 n.64.
Prior to the onset of the AIDS epidemic, nearly half of the states had statutes imposing
criminal penalties for the knowing transmission of venereal diseases. See Prentice & Murray,
Liability for Transmission of Herpes: Using Traditional Tort Principles to Encourage Honesty
in Sexual Relationships, II J. CONTEMP. L. 67, 100 n.215 (1984). Some of these statutes are
sufficiently broad to make possible their application to HIV transmission. See Sullivan & Field,
sipra note 97, at 170-71.
Infected individuals who engage in sexual activity may also face civil liability. See Baruch,
AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome, 22 TORT & INs. L.J. 165 (1987); Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 9, at 916-
18; Comment, You Never Told Me ... You Never Asked; Tort Liability for the Sexual
Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. L. REv. 529 (1986). Legislation has been proposed to extend
such civil liability by eliminating the defense that one did not know that one was infectious.
See id. at 917.
105. There are a number of other possible challenges to the constitutionality of these
proposals. Insofar as premarital testing is enacted in response to unsubstantiated fear, see supra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text, it is likely to be held to embody an illegitimate legislative
purpose under City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See Note,
AIDS Carriers, supra note 7, at 1280-81. For a discussion of Cleburne and other cases
invalidating governmental actions based on illegitimate purposes, see generally Note, Still Newer
Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1454
(1986).
It might also be argued that apart from any burden it might impose on the right to marry,
see infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text, being compelled to learn of one's HIV antibody
status might be an unjustified abridgement of one's liberty interest "in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions," Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), and thus
a separate substantive due process violation. At least one court appears to have rejected such
an argument, however, see Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dept.
of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.D.C. 1987), stating that the "psychological concerns" of a
person informed of HIV infection "do not themselves raise constitutional privacy issues." Id.
The possibility that premarital testing statutes do not adequately ensure the confidentiality
of test results, see, e.g., Brune, Group Rips AIDS Report on Marriage Applicant, Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 21, 1988, at 26, may also implicate the constitutional "interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
The actual physical intrusion that coerced testing imposes would probably require analysis
under the fourth amendment, cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (with-
drawal of blood to determine alcohol content in connection with drunk driving arrest a "search"
and "seizure" within the fourth amendment), although it seems likely that, because of the
regulatory, non-criminal context of the testing, the statute would be subject to. a general
reasonableness test. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) ("probable
cause" exists for building inspections if reasonable standards for conducting area inspections
are satisfied). It might also be argued that, because of the long history of state regulation of
marriage and premarital physical examinations for venereal disease, see supra notes 5 & 7 and
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state legislatures' ° and were given the imprimatur of the editor of the Journal
of the American Medical Association in 1985.'07 Separate consideration will
be given to the constitutionality of statutes, such as those enacted in Illinois'08
and Louisiana,'19 which do not prohibit marriage by individuals with positive
test results," 0 and to measures which would bar such marriages."'
A. Testing
1. Mandatory testing as a burden on the right to marry
The Zablocki Court stressed that not every regulation relating to marriage
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny." 2 In analyzing the constitution-
accompanying text, a lower expectation of privacy would justify a relaxed level of fourth
amendment protection. Cf. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981) (warrantless
inspections required by the Mine, Safety & Health Act do not offend the fourth amendment);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (warrantless searches authorized by the
Gun Control Act of 1968 do not violate the fourth amendment); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (administrative searches of intensively regulated
industries are constitutional even without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing).
In addition to invoking various federal constitutional theories, it might be possible to argue
that premarital testing statutes violate rights embodied in state constitutions. See generally
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAuv. L. REv. 489
(1977) (numerous state courts have extended to their citizens, via state constitutions, greater
protections than Supreme Court has held are applicable under the Bill of Rights); McGrath,
Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HAxv. L. REv.
1324 (1982) (state constitutions have significant role to play as protectors of individual rights
and liberties); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RuToERs L. REv. 707 (1983) (for the balance of this century, state constitutions will play
increasingly important role in guaranteeing fundamental rights); Note, Toward a Right to
Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631 (1977) (many states
now provide explicit right to privacy in their constitutions); Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties:
State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 110 GA. L. REV. 533 (1976) (growing
number of state courts are extending individual rights guarantees embodied in their state
constitutions beyond analogous federal guarantees). Cf. Note, The Use of the State Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy to Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 973
(1986) (methods for which sodomy law can be challenged as violative of state constitutions
based on right to privacy grounds).
106. See Brandt, Four Lessons, supra note 2, at 369.
107. See Lundberg, The Age of AIDS: A Great Time for Defensive Living, 253 J. A.M.A.
3440 (1985). One commentator recently called Lundberg's recommendations for AIDS preven-
tion, which included not engaging in "sexual activity (oral, anal, or vaginal) with someone who
has the AIDS virus," id., a "cavalier prescription." Comment, Constitutional Implications,
supra note 97, at 227.
108. Illinois Marriage & Dissolution of Marriage Act of Sept. 22, 1975, as amended Pub.
Act 85-935, ch. 40, § 3 (1987).
109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 230-31 (West Supp. 1988).
110. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 204 (1987) (prohibiting issuance of marriage licenses
to individuals found to have syphilis).
111. Utah prohibits marriage "with a person afflicted with acquired immune deficiency
syndrome," UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(1) (Supp. 1987), but does not require premarital tests
for HIV infection.
112. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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ality of premarital testing statutes which do not directly prohibit marriage
by infected individuals, the threshold determination must be whether such
legislation demands "critical examination" under Zablocki."3
In drawing a distinction between statutes triggering such heightened scru-
tiny and those "reasonable regulations" which could "legitimately be im-
posed" without special constitutional justification, the Court attempted to
reconcile the result in Zablocki with that reached in a case decided earlier
the same term, Califano v. Jobst.' 4 Jobst upheld a section of the Social
Security Act which reduced certain individuals' benefits upon their marriage,
rejecting the proposition that classifications based on marital status are
"suspect."' ' 5 Although the Court recognized that the provision at issue might
"have an impact on ... a beneficiary's desire to marry and make some
suitors less welcome than others," '" 6 the Court also declared that Congress
could permissibly enact such a rule "in the course of constructing a complex
social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family
life.'''' 7
In dealing with the right to marry issue, Jobst seemed to indicate that
only statutes which have the effect of purposefully burdening the decision
to marry should trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny." 8 The Court
emphasized that Jobst was not, unlike Loving, "a case in which government
seeks to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling by banning ...nonconforming
marriages,"" 9 or "an attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to
make a decision as important as marriage."' 2 0
Zablocki is distinguishable from Jobst based on the purposefulness of the
interference with the marriage decision.' 2 ' This is because the statute consid-
ered in Zablocki expressly prohibited marriage by individuals under child
support orders without a judicial determination that the obligation had been
met. The Court in Zablocki, however, instead relied on "the directness and
substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry" to strike the
statute and distinguish the case from Jobst.1'" While the Zablocki Court
quoted language from Jobst which indicated that there was no intent on the
part of the legislature to interfere with the freedom to marry,' 23 it did so
113. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976)).
114. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
115. Jobst held that classifications based on marital status are "of a different character from
racial classifications," id. at 53, because they are not "an unthinking response to stereotyped
generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged group." Id. at 54.
•116. Id. at 58.
117. Id. at 54 n.11.
118. See Note, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1252 n.23 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Developments].
119. 434 U.S. at 54 n.11.
120. Id. at 54.
121. See Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 13, at 689-90.




only after identifying "directness" and "substantiality" as the relevant
inquiries. Moreover, the Zablocki Court never directly commented upon the
obvious purposeful effect of the statute before it:124 It thus appears that,
after Zablocki, intent is only relevant when reached as a conclusion based
on an examination of directness and substantiality, and not as the subject
of a separate inquiry.'"
Because the statute in Zablocki both directly and substantially interfered
with the right to marry,'1 the Court did not discuss whether interference
which is either solely direct or solely substantial would be sufficient to trigger
heightened scrutiny. In Lyng v. Castillo,' 7 however, the Supreme Court
quoted Zablocki to explain that heightened scrutiny was not necessary be-
cause the statute at issue in the case 28 did not 'directly and substantially'
interfere with family living arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental
right." 12 9 This formulation may suggest that a statute would have to both
"directly" and "substantially" interfere with the right to marry in order to
trigger heightened scrutiny under Zablocki.
This two-pronged requirement has, in fact, been adopted by a number of
lower federal courts30 which have disposed of challenges to government anti-
nepotism policies' 3' and differential treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code based on marital status.12 These courts simply noted that the inter-
ference with the marriage decision was "indirect" and ended their inquiry
on that basis.'33 On closer examination, however, it appears that the result
reached in several of these cases would have been the same if the substantiality
of the burden had also been weighed. 34 Their language on the application
of Zablocki, therefore, can be considered dicta.
124. See Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1252 n.23.
125. See id. Like a tortfeasor who is "presumed to intend the natural consequences of his
acts ... the legislature can be presumed to have intended that significant interferences will in
fact have an impact on the marriage decision." Id.
126. 434 U.S. at 387.
127. 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
128. Castillo involved a challenge to the definition of "household" in the Food Stamp Act,
7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1982 & Supp. Il 1985), which treats parents, siblings, and children who
five together, but not more distant relatives or unrelated persons who do so, as a single
household for purposes of defining eligibility for food stamps.
129. 477 U.S. at 638. See also Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and
Agric. Implement Workers, 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (1988) (quoting Zablocki to explain that
strict scrutiny was not appropriate).
130. See cases cited in Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1252 n.24. See also Cutts v.
Fowler, 692 F.2d 138, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (burden on right to marry "attenuated and indirect").
131. See, e.g., Southwestern Community Action Council v. Community Servs. Admin., 462
F. Supp. 289 (S.D. W.Va. 1978).
132. See, e.g., Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978).
133. Mapes, 576 F.2d at 901; Southwestern Community Action Council, 462 F. Supp. at
298.
134. See Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1252-53 n.24; see also Sebetic v. Hagerty,
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More importantly, despite the Supreme Court's own confusing recitation
of the "direct and substantial" language, the Court does not appear to
actually require that both be present before applying heightened scrutiny. In
Castillo, for example, the Court considered whether the section of the Food
Stamp Act which defines households for purposes of eligibility for food
stamps"' burdened the right to determine one's "family living arrange-
ments."1 36 The.Court began its analysis by noting that "[tihe 'household'
definition does not order or prevent any group of persons from dining
together.' 37 If a finding that direct interference-in the sense of a substi-
tution of the government's decision-making apparatus for the individual's-
was necessary to apply heightened scrutiny, this observation would have
ended the inquiry. Moreover, if the concept of direct interference was
interpreted to mean regulation placed directly on the family relationship, 3 ,
the regulation in Castillo was still clearly indirect.139 The Castillo Court did
not end its analysis with indirectness, however, and proceeded to consider
the insubstantiality of the burden as well:
(I]n the overwhelming majority of cases it probably has no effect at all.
It is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live apart
simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for the cost of separate
housing would almost certainly exceed the incremental value of the addi-
tional stamps.'-
The Court subsequently used the Castillo approach to determine whether
fundamental rights were burdened in Lyng v. International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers. '' The UAW
640 F. Supp. 1274, 1277-78 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (anti-nepotism policy did not "significantly
interfere" with the right to marry but had only a "minimal residual impact"). In fact, the
court in Southwestern Community Action Council appears to have considered the substantiality
of the burden, and the importance of the governmental interest in eliminating nepotism, in
addition to the indirectness of the interference. 462 F. Supp. at 296-98.
135. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1982).
136. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. at 635, 638 (1986). Although the Castillo Court did not
explicitly indicate the derivation of this fundamental right, it apparently assumed its existence.
The source of the right would appear to be the substantive due process "privacy interest in
family living arrangements" which a plurality of the Court recognized in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 J.S. 494 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.). See Castillo, 477 U.S. at 644-45
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. 477 U.S. at 638.
138. See Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1250-53 (direct interference with right to
marry was read to include setting a legal prerequisite on issuance of a marriage license in
addition, as in Zablocki, to placing the marriage decision in the state's control).
139. It is hard to see, however, why such a concept of directness should have constitutional
significance, because indirect means would almost always be available to achieve ends that
could not be achieved directly. See id. at 1253. For further support for the proposition that
"indirect" statutes might nonetheless impact the decision to marry, see Drinan, supra note 13,
at 368 nn.36-37 and accompanying text.
140. 477 U.S. at 638.
141. 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988).
HIV ANTIBODY TESTING
case concerned an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that precluded house-
holds from becoming eligible for food stamps when the decrease in household
income resulted from a member being on strike. 142 Although this regulation
of "family living arrangements" was even less direct than the one considered
in Castillo, the Court repeated its Castillo analysis, and found that the
statute "certainly does not 'order' any individuals not to dine together; nor
does it in any other way 'directly and substantially' interfere with family
living arrangements.'" 14 The Court again, therefore, went beyond a finding
of indirectness to consider insubstantiality as well.
There is a final reason for concluding that application of heightened
scrutiny under Zablocki does not require direct interference with the right
to marry. Although it may have initially appeared that in Zablocki the Court
was carving out a unique test for the application of heightened scrutiny
under the fundamental right to marry,'" in Califano v. Aznavorian,'4 it
specifically invoked the Zablocki-Jobst distinction to hold that legislation
having only "incidental effect" on the right to travel should be upheld unless
"wholly irrational."46 Aznavorian, therefore, clarified that the fundamental
right to marry is to be treated no differently from other fundamental rights.
Yet it is clearly the case that fundamental rights other than marriage have
been held to have been burdened by merely indirect government action.147
Further, the application of Zablocki-Jobst to areas other than marriage
and family was reaffirmed as recently as the UA W case, where the "direct
and substantial" test was again applied. In that case, after the Court
determined that the strikers' rights concerning their family living arrange-
ments were not burdened, it then applied the same "direct and substantial"
test to address the separate question of whether the effect of the statute was
to burden the fundamental associational rights of the workers to organize
in unions.1'" Moreover, in applying the test, the Court again went beyond
an initial finding of indirectness to find that the statute did not burden the
workers' rights to associate "in any significant manner."' 49
If both the "directness" and "substantiality" of the interference with the
right to marry are weighed, premarital HIV testing statutes should trigger
heightened scrutiny. By placing an additional "legal obstacle in the path of
persons desiring to get married,""10 the interference produced by these sta-
142. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 109, 95 Stat. 361 (1981).
143. 108 S. Ct. at 1189 (emphasis added).
144. Heightened scrutiny has been applied in cases involving fundamental rights other than
the right to marry, even when the statutes at issue were arguably less burdensome than the
provision upheld in Jobst. See Note, Fundamental Right, supra note 11, at 612.
145. 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
146. See id. at 176-77.
147. See Note, Fundamental Right, supra note 11, at 612-13.
148. See Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers,
108 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (1988).
149. See Note, Fundamental Right, supra note 11, at 612-13.
150. See 108 S. Ct. at 1189-90.
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tutes is clearly more direct than the statute considered in Jobst,"' although
it is less direct than the outright ban in Loving or the requirement of judicial
authorization in Zablocki.
Judging from the experience in Illinois and Louisiana, states which have
adopted premarital HIV screening, the interference also appears to be sub-
stantial."2 In Illinois, the number of individuals seeking marriage licenses
dropped sharply following the imposition of mandatory testing,'" as "hun-
dreds of Illinois couples" decided to marry "in other states or not to marry
at all. ' ' 1 4 According to the chair of the Human Services Committee of the
Louisiana House of Representatives, a similar number of couples residing
in his state have chosen to marry in Arkansas, Mississippi, or Texas to avoid
the testing law.15'
It is likely that one of the reasons for the decision not to marry in a state
imposing HIV antibody testing is the cost of the test." 6 The cost, reported
to be as high as $200 in Louisiana'" and $300 in Illinois,"' is due to the
necessity of a more specific, confirmatory test should the initial screening
test result be positive." 9 Such costs may literally prevent some indigent
individuals from marrying.'14 If such is the case, there is strong reason to
believe that heightened scrutiny should be applied in determining of whether
the testing statutes should be upheld, 6' at least as applied to indigents. 6 2
In Boddie v. Connecticut,'6' the Court held that due process demanded
extraordinary justification before a state could deny indigents access to its
courts for the purpose of divorce."' It is difficult to see, therefore, how
151. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978).
152. See supra note 140.
153. "In Cook County, where nearly half of all Illinois marriages take place, the number of
marriage applications in the first three weeks of January dropped from 1,500 last year to 600
now." Wilkerson, Pre-Nuptial AIDS Screening Taxes Illinois Health System, N.Y. Times, Jan.
26, 1988, at A12, col. 3.
154. Editorial, AIDS, Marriage and Folly in Illinois, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at A30.
155. See Couples' AIDS Test Dealt 2 Setbacks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1988, at A22, col. I
[hereinafter Couples' Test].
156. See Editorial, supra note 154, at A30.
157. See Couples' Test, supra note 155, at A22, col. I.
158. See Wilkerson, supra note 153, at col. 4.
159. See id. For a discussion of the accuracy of HIV antibody tests, see infra notes 178-82
and accompanying text.
160. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigents unable to pay court costs
averaging $60, plus an additional $15-50 for service of process that is necessary for divorce).
161. See AIDS and Civil Liberties Project, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation,
Mandatory Pre-Marital Testing 4 (1988).
162. The court in Boddie held that "a cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend due
process" because of a particular party's "circumstances." 401 U.S. at 379-80.
163. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
164. In reaching this conclusion, Boddie had stated that because of the "state monopolization
of the means" for dissolving a marriage, id. at 374, no individual could remarry without first
"invoking the State's judicial machinery." Id. at 376. However, United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973), which held that indigents' rights were not violated by non-waivable filing fees
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statutes mandating that hundreds of dollars in testing costs be absorbed by
marriage license applicants could be constitutionally applied to indigents
without requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling justification. One
distinction between the premarital testing case and Boddie is that the latter
involved access to the "machinery for dispute settlement" provided by the
court system. 6 Boddie did not hold, however, "that access for all individuals
to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause"' but noted, rather, that "in the case before us" such
access was "the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental
human relationship.' ' 6 7 In light of the Court's subsequent limitation of
Boddie, in United States v. Kras,I'6 to the divorce context, it certainly appears
that Boddie was substantially more concerned with the right to marry than
the right of court access.'19
It appears unlikely that the imposition of a $200 or $300 cost would in
and of itself constitute substantial interference with a non-indigent's right
to marry. Jobst involved a loss of social security benefits, 70 but the Court
held that this change was less significant than the "changes in economic
status" that "normally" attend marriage.' 7 ' While Zablocki involved an
enforced change in economic status via the mechanism of child support
obligations,'7 2 it was a potentially more drastic change than could have been
produced by the loss of the social security benefits in Jobst. '
The economic impact of the test requirement, however, may not be the
most significant burden. Although individuals at high risk for HIV infection
are likely to know this fact,'7 4 being forced to receive confirmation of one's
infection carries potentially devastating psychological effects,'7 Moreover,
the possibility of disclosure of that information might make one the target
in bankruptcy court, distinguished Boddie by stressing that the Boddie Court had "emphasized
that 'marriage involves interests of basic importance to our society,"' id. at 444 (quoting
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376), and by stating that the denial of access in Boddie "touched directly
... on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the establishment
and dissolution of that relationship." Id.
165. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375.
166. Id. at 382.
167. Id. at 383.
168. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
169. See supra note 164.
170. Because the Jobsts had become eligible to receive benefits under other provisions of the
statute, the total decrease in benefits only amounted to $20 per month. See Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47, 48-49 n.4, 57 n.17.
171. Id. at 53-54. For a useful discussion of the importance of economic considerations in
substantiality analysis, see Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1254.
172. See Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1254 n.29.
173. It should be noted, however, that in the case of some recipients of the benefits at issue
in Jobst, the cancellation of those benefits might have had far more dramatic consequences
than it had for Jobst himself. See Note, Fundamental Right, supra note 11. at 611-12.
174. See Note, AIDS Carriers, supra note 7, at 1287-88.
175. See id. at 1287; Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 9, at 875-77.
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of panic, 176 and the disclosure itself may lead to discrimination. 17
These effects, moreover, would not be limited to those individuals actually
carrying HIV infection, since premarital testing can be expected to produce
a significant number of "false positives." The most widely used test for the
presence of HIV antibodies, the enzyme-linked immunoassay ("ELISA")
test, is far more "sensitive" than it is "specific." This means that the ELISA
will produce significantly more falsely positive results than falsely negative
ones in a population where the prevalence of the virus is low. 78 The precise
percentage of false positives for ELISA tests appears to vary widely de-
pending on the commercial laboratory performing the test,' 79 with one study
finding 55016 of positive ELISA results to be false positives.11° Because of
the specificity problem encountered in the use of the ELISA alone, a second
test, called the Western blot test, is commonly used as a confirmatory test. 8"
However, the question of what constitutes a "positive" Western blot result
has proven controversial, with performance procedures varying considera-
bly.182
Because of the uncertainty associated with HIV testing, and the common
perception that a large percentage of positive results will be false positives, 183
as well as the extreme consequences which even a false positive result can
have for one's life, many couples can be expected to simply not take the
risk. Given that likelihood, heightened scrutiny of mandatory premarital
HIV testing seems appropriate. The next section considers whether HIV
testing could survive such scrutiny.
2. Premarital HIV antibody testing under heightened constitutional
scrutiny
Although first imposed well before the Supreme Court's articulation of a
right to marry, premarital testing for syphilis and other sexually transmitted
diseases seems, superficially at least, to provide a compelling retort to the
suggestion that premarital HIV testing could somehow be unconstitutional.
If testing for less serious sexually transmitted diseases is apparently not
176. See supm note 97.
177. See, e.g., AIDS Discrimination Unit, New York City Commission on Human Rights,
Report on Discrimination Against People with AIDS and People Perceived to Have AIDS:
January 1986-June 1987 (Aug. 1987).
178. See Schwartz, Dans & Kinosian, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Test Evaluation,
Performance, and Use, 259 J. A.M.A. 2574 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, HIV Test].
179. See Burke & Redfield, 256 J. A.M.A. 347 (1986) (5 laboratories produced 85-100 percent
accuracy).
180. See Fleming, Cochi, Steece & Hull, AIDS in Low-Incidence Areas: How Safe Is Unsafe
Sex?, 258 J. A.M.A. 785 (1987).
181. See Schwartz, HIV Test, supra note 178, at 2575.
182. Id.
183. In its editorial opposing premarital HIV testing, the New York Times warned that
"perhaps a third" of marriage license applicants "who test positive by both AIDS tests" will
have received false positives. Editorial, supra note 154, at A30.
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subject to serious objection, how could premarital HIV screening be objec-
tionable?'1 Indeed, the view that past public health efforts against venereal
disease should provide a model for conducting the fight against AIDS is an
influential one.' 5
The argument is, nonetheless, only superficially persuasive. As has been
suggested, the governmental interest in testing for syphilis is much clearer;
after all, those who test positive can be cured"8 6 and transmission to their
sex partners can be prevented.'87 While this difference in governmental
interest is important, in terms of analysis of the testing programs under the
right to marry, it is not the most critical one. Although the government may
have more reason to want to know whether an individual has syphilis than
whether she or he has HIV infection, the information that one tests positive
for HIV is far more devastating for the seropositive individual than is a
positive result for syphilis.' 8 As discussed in the previous section, these
devastating consequences support the conclusion that mandatory HIV testing
actually burdens the decision to marry, thereby triggering the requirement
for a heightened constitutional scrutiny that is not necessarily applicable to
statutes requiring testing for other sexually transmitted diseases.
Further, if constitutional scrutiny more searching than the Supreme Court's
traditional, deferential review of public health statutes'89 were applied to
premarital venereal disease testing, it is not clear that the testing could be
upheld. The cost of premarital syphilis screening has been estimated at $80
million a year'90 or $240,000 per case of syphilis actually detected.' 9' Those
test results constitute only a tiny percentage of all syphilis cases reported,'
92
suggesting that the money spent on such testing could be spent far more
effectively in combatting the disease in some other manner.' 93 The enormous
waste of pre-marital screening for venereal disease has led to the repeal of
the test requirements in a number of states.19'
If, unlike routine premarital screening for syphilis, premarital HIV testing
does "directly and substantially" interfere with the right to marry, under
184. Brandt, Four Lessons, supra note 2, at 369.
185. See, e.g., Cutler & Arnold, Venereal Disease Control by Health Departments in the
Past: Lessons for the Present, 78 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 7372 (1988).
186. See Brandt, Four Lesson, supra note 2, at 370.
187. See id. at 369.
188. See Note, AIDS Carriers, supra note 7, at 1287 n.78.
189. See supra note 7.
190. See Felman, Repeal of Mandated Premarital Tests for Syphilis: A Survey of State
Health Officers, 71 Am. J. PuB. HEAL.TH 155 (1981).
191. See Haskell, A Cost-Benefit-Analysis of California's Mandatory Premarital Screening
Program for Syphilis, 141 W. J. MED. 538 (1984).
192. See Brandt, Four Lessons, supra note 2, at 369.
193. See Monahan, State Legislation and Control of Marriage, 2 J. F A. L. 30, 33-35 (1962).
Monahan argues that the money spent on premarital sexually transmitted disease screening
could be better used to educate individuals about sexually transmitted diseases.
194. See Gostin, supra note 100, at 56; Brandt, Four Lessons, supra note 2. at 369-70.
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the reasoning set forth in Zablocki v. Redhail, the testing must be subject
to "critical examination."' 95 That critical examination imposes two require-
ments: the testing program must: (1) advance "sufficiently important state
interests;"'1' and (2) be "closely tailored to effectuate only these interests."' 97
HIV testing can only be upheld if it satisfies both of these requirements.
Commentators have disagreed'98 as to whether the the Zablocki two-part
test is as rigorous as the "strict scrutiny"'" the Court has applied in reviewing
racially discriminatory laws under the equal protection clause' ° and in some
substantive due process cases. 201 The confusion is understandable, given that
Zablocki avoided using either the phrase "strict scrutiny" 2zm or the precise
verbal formulation which has previously been used to describe this test. 2 3
This ambiguity is arguably intentional, both because the majority opinion
may have sought to accommodate disagreements on the Court concerning
the appropriate standard of review,2 and because the author of the Zablocki
opinion, Justice Marshall, has repeatedly indicated his impatience with con-
clusory descriptions of the "level" of judicial scrutiny.205
For the purpose of analysis of premarital HIV testing, however, the
ambiguity does not produce a significant problem. While there may indeed
195. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976)).
196. 434 U.S. at 388.
197. Id.
198. Compare Recent Cases, 47 U. CiN. L. REv. 334, 337 (1978) with Note, Constitutional
Law, supra note 13, at 691-92 ("critical examination" discussed as less than strict scrutiny and
as "functionally equivalent" to strict scrutiny).
199. The phrase was apparently used for the first time in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942).
200. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
201. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
202. The choice of the phrase "critical examination," however, may have been intended to
signal that strict scrutiny was at play. In using the phrase, Zablocki cited the following passage
from Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), a case refusing to apply strict scrutiny: "Under the
circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject the State's resolution of competing interests in this
case to the degree of critical examination that our cases under the Equal Protection Clause
recently have characterized as 'strict judicial scrutiny."' Id. at 314. It is possible to read this
language as equating the term "critical examination" with "strict scrutiny." See Note, Con-
stitutional Law, supra note 13, at 691 n.64.
203. In Palmore, the Court expressed the test as follows: "[Racial] classifications are subject
to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest and must be "necessary ... to the accomplishment of their
legitimate purpose." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
204. The contemporary Court has been marked by considerable division concerning the
appropriateness of expanding strict scrutiny beyond the area of racial discrimination. For
another example of an attempt to accommodate such disagreement, compare Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (disagreement over standard of scrutiny for gender discrimination).




be some difference between "a compelling state interest," 206 required under
strict scrutiny, 20 and an interest which is merely "important, '208 one can
safely assume that the state purpose of preventing the spread of AIDS would
qualify as either "important" or "compelling. '" 209 As for the closeness of
the fit between the state's purpose and the means selected to advance that
purpose, it is very difficult to discern any difference between Zablocki's
requirement that the means be "closely tailored" and "effectuate only" the
governmental objective and strict scrutiny's demand that "legislative enact-
ments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake.1 210
Both Zablocki and the strict scrutiny cases appear to demand that legis-
lation be neither "overinclusive," by infringing on protected rights more
broadly than necessary to effectuate the governmental purpose, nor "un-
derinclusive," by failing to truly advance the asserted objective. 21' Because
premarital HIV testing is both overinclusive and underinclusive, it should
not withstand constitutional analysis under the right to marry regardless of
which standard is used.
Perhaps it is the wildly overinclusive nature of premarital HIV testing that
is the program's most obvious constitutional failing. Dr. Louise McFarland,
a physician with the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, con-
ceded in an interview with the New York Times, that "couples planning
marriage [are] not generally members of groups with high risk for infection
with the virus." 212 The prevalence of HIV infection among heterosexuals
who are not in any high-risk group has been estimated at 1 in every 10,000
individuals . 2 1 Although statistics are not available for Louisiana, in Illinois
premarital testing apparently uncovered only I case of infection for every
4,000 people tested. 214
Moreover, because the demographics of the epidemic are generally known,
those applicants who are in high risk groups are not likely to need the
206. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
207. See, e.g., Palmore, 466 U.S. at 429; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
208. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court accepted the premise that a state
interest in protecting "the potentiality of life" was "important," id. at 162, while holding that
the interest became "compelling" only after viability. Id. at 163.
209. Even in purely economic terms, the toll of the AIDS epidemic is truly catastrophic,
with the costs for medical care for people with AIDS having been projected at between $8 and
$16 billion by 1991. See Confronting AIDS, supra note 74, at 159.
210. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
211. For a discussion of statutory overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness, see generally
Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CI.n'. L. Rjv. 341 (1949).
212. Couples' Test, supra note 155, at A22, col. 1. The New York Times has observed that
"[pleople getting married ... are unlikely to be homosexual or particularly prone to drug
abuse." Editorial, supra note 154.
213. See Hearst & Hulley, supra note 81, at 2428.
214. See Couples' Test, supra note 155. Obviously, some individuals seeking marriage licenses
are in "high risk groups," accounting for the higher incidence of infection than would be
expected if only low-risk individuals married.
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additional information supplied by an antibody test result to be aware of
their increased risk of infection." 5 While providing these individuals with
information concerning alternatives to high-risk sexual behavior can be
effective in preventing HIV transmission, 1 6 providing them with an antibody
test result does not necessarily encourage the selection of lower-risk sexual
activity. 1 7 Thus, it appears that a less burdensome means of achieving the
goal that premarital testing seeks to achieve is merely to require that marriage
license applicants receive educational materials concerning AIDS and HIV,
as do the states of California, Hawaii, and Virginia. " 'a
Some of the factors that render premarital testing overinclusive also con-
tribute to its being simultaneously unconstitutionally underinclusive.2 1 9 By
requiring the diversion of tremendous resources'o to identify only a tiny
handful of new cases of HIV infection, 2 ' premarital testing "robs funds"
from effective programs designed to combat AIDS.m" The result of this
actually impedes the accomplishment of the goal of AIDS prevention.2 23
Premarital HIV screening is underinclusive in another important way as
well: a negative test result does not mean that an individual is free of
infection. The failure of HIV testing to identify all infectious individuals is
the result of several factors, including the occasional use of improper test
performance procedures at commercial laboratories. 4 Even when conducted
215. See Note, AIDS Carriers, supra note 7, at 1287-88.
216. The effectiveness of "safer sex" information in changing behavior among gay and
bisexual men is well-documented. See, e.g., Klein, Sullivan, Wolcott, Landsverk, Namir &
Fawzy, Changes in AIDS Risk Behaviors Among Homosexual Male Physicians and University
Students, 144 Am. J. PsYcHiATRY 742 (1987) [hereinafter Klein]; Winkelstein, Samuel, Padian,
Wiley, Lang, Anderson & Levy, The San Francisco Men's Health Study: II. Reduction in
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission Among Homosexual/Bisexual Men, 1982-86, 77
AM. J. PuB. HE.Lt 685 (1987) [hereinafter Winkelstein]. Reducing the sexual transmission of
HIV by intravenous drug users may be more difficult, however, and certainly requires educa-
tional approaches and materials designed specifically for this population. Id. at 746. See
Landesman, Ginzburg & Weiss, The AIDS Epidemic, NEw ENo. J. MED. 521-25 (1985).
217. See McCusker, Stoddard, Mayer, Zapka, Morrison, & Saltzman, Effects of Antibody
Test Knowledge on Subsequent Sexual Behaviors in a Cohort of Homosexually Active Men, 78
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 462, 464-65 (1988).
218. See Wilkerson, supra note 153, at A12, cols. 5-6.
219. Many statutes are both overinclusive and underinclusive. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA,
J. YouNo, CONSTrrUtONAL LAW § 14.3, at 528 (3d ed. 1986).
220. One critic of premarital testing in Illinois has remarked: "This is the most expensive
public health program going." Wilkerson, supra note 153, at A12, col. 2.
221. It has been estimated that a national premarital testing requirement would identify only
about 1200 new "true positives." Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin, & Fineberg, Com-
pulsory Premarital Screening For The Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J. A.M.A. 1757,
1769 (1987). This is less than one percent of all those infected with HIV. See Wilkerson, supra
note 153, at A12, col. 3.
222. Editorial, supra note 154.
223. Critics of premarital screening have commented that the program "divert[s] already
overworked AIDS specialists" from focusing on "the people most at risk for the disease-drug
users and homosexual men." Wilkerson, supra note 153, at A12, col. 2.
224. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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properly, however, HIV screening fails to detect about one in 100 individuals
who have developed antibody for the virus, as well as all of those whose
infection is still in a latent period before antibodies have been produced.2 25
While this latent period is commonly believed to average about ten weeks a6
some researchers believe that seroconversion takes much longer when HIV
is sexually transmitted.2 7 In any case, there may be a small percentage of
HIV-infected individuals who take a significantly longer time period than
average to produce antibodies.2 s
As important as the inefficacy of the antibody test and the inefficiency of
testing low-risk individuals, premarital HIV testing is not "closely tailored"
to the goal of AIDS prevention because couples seeking a marriage license
are likely to have engaged in a significant period of sexual intimacy before
marriage. This practice, while commonplace in American society today,2 9 is
radically discordant with the view of sexual conduct that motivated and
justified the earlier venereal disease testing statutes. One of the most powerful
images in the crusade against venereal disease was that of the young man
who, having engaged in sex with prostitutes or other "unchaste" women
before marriage, would then marry-and infect-an innocent woman. 230 In
fact, a major decision concerning the constitutionality of VD testing, Peter-
son v. Widule,2 1 upheld the statute's requirement that men-but not women-
225. See Hearst & Hulley, supra note 81, at 2429. See also Transfusion-Associated T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type IJI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infection From A Serone-
gative Donor, 35 MoaamIY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 389 (1986) (currently available screening
tests fail to detect HTLV-III/LAV antibody in a minority of infected persons); Salahuddin,
Markham, Redfield, Essex, Groopman, Sarangadharan, McLane; Sliski & Gallo, HTL V-II In
Symptom-Free Seronegative Persons, II THE LANCET 1418 (Dec. 22, 1984) (of 96 patients with
AIDS or AIDS-related complex and healthy individuals at risk for AIDS, four had no detectable
antibodies).
226. See Hearst & Hulley, supra note 81, at 2429.
227. See Ranki, Valle, Krohn, Antonen, Allain, Leuther, Franchin & Krohn, Long Latency
Precedes Overt Seroconversion in Sexually Transmitted Human-Immunodeficiency- Virus Infec-
tion, II THE LANCET 589 (Sept. 12, 1987).
228. See Groopman, Chen, Hopo, Andrews, Swift, Benton, Sullivan, Volberding, Sites,
Landesman, Gold, Baker, Craven & Boches, Serological Characterization of HTL V-I1 Infection
in AIDS and Related Disorders, 153 J. IN'cTious DIsEASs 736 (1986) [hereinafter Groopman];
Mayer, Stoddard, McCusker, Ayotte, Ferriani, Groopman, Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type-
III in High-Risk, Antibody-Negative Homosexual Men, 104 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 194 (1986).
229. Illustrative of the matter-of-fact manner in which premarital sexual activity is now
treated is an interview appearing in the New York Times with a Chicago couple seeking a
marriage license under Illinois' mandatory HIV testing law. The couple, whose names, ages,
and photograph appeared in the story, told the newspaper that "they figured that if they did
test positive they would get married anyway" because, as the woman explained, "'If he was
positive that would mean I had it too."' Wilkerson, supra note 153, at A12, cols. 3-4.
230. These events were dramatized in a popular 1913 Broadway play. See Brandt, Historical
Perspective, supra note" 2, at 38, 305 (citing E. BRiEux, DAMAOED GooDs (J. Pollak trans.
1913)). For a discussion of the play as representative of social attitudes, see A. BRANDT, supra
note 2 at 38, 305 n.5.
231. 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914).
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submit to testing. The Court cited both "medical evidence" and "what we
suppose to be common knowledge" that "the great majority of women who
marry are pure, while a considerable percentage of men have had illicit
sexual relations before marriage.'" 3 2 Therefore, the Court reasoned that "the
number of cases where newly married men transmit a venereal disease to
their wives is vastly greater than the number of cases where women transmit
the disease to their new husbands.D23
The view that venereal disease was transmitted from husbands to wives
(and not from wives to husbands) was connected to two powerful social
conceptions: 1) the sexual "double standard" in which premarital sexuality
was vehemently condemned for women but tacitly accepted for men;23 and
2) the rigidly enforced division of women into the "virtuous," who did not
engage in sex before marriage, and the "debased," whose sexual activity
outside of marriage made them unmarriageable.2 31
However close to (or far from) reality these images may have been at the
time that premarital venereal disease testing measures were enacted, they do
not depict the social mores of the United States today. Premarital sexual
activity, especially by women, has increased significantly in recent decades. 36
This sexual activity often takes place between individuals who plan or hope
to marry one another,3 7 and often lead to periods of unmarried cohabita-
tion.23 1
If men and women engage in repeated sexual contact before marriage,
forcing them to submit to testing for a sexually transmitted disease upon
their application for a marriage license does not exhibit a constitutionally
close fit with the goal of preventing disease transmission. Moreover, if, as
the statistics from Illinois and Louisiana suggest, 2 9 such testing may dis-
courage the entrance into an officially sanctified, legally monogamous re-
232. Id. at 648, 147 N.W. at 968.
233. Id.
234. See generally Reiss, The Double Standard in Premarital Sexual Intercourse, 34 SOCIAL
FORCES 224 (1956) (analysis and discussion of characteristics of premarital double standard in
sexual intercourse).
235. One of the primary reasons venereal disease evoked dread and opprobrium was that it
was seen as "link[ing] the debased harlot and the virtuous wife in the kinship of a common
disease." A. BwaNr, supra note 2, at 32 (quoting P. MORROW, SocIAl. DISEAsES AND MARRIAGE
vi (1904)).
236. See T. CAPLow, H. BAHR, B. CHADWICK, R. Hn± & M. WnuE.AbSON, MIDDLETOWN
FAhmms: FIFTY YARs oF CHANGE AND CONTINurrY 161-94 (1982) [hereinafter T. CAPL~wl.
237. See id. at 168.
238. For support for the proposition that more unmarried couples are living together, see
United States Census Bureau, Marital Status and Living Arrangements 2 (1988) (cited in A.P.,
May 13, 1988); Macklin, Nonmarital Heterosexual Cohabitation, 1:2 MARRIAGE & FAd. REv.
I (March/April 1978). Many of these couples view their relationships as possibly or probably
leading to marriage. See T. CAPLOW, supra note 236, at 168.
239. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
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lationship, the intended statutory cure may actually contribute to the spread
of the disease.m
B. Prohibition
It has been asserted that a prohibition of marriage, where one spouse
"might communicate a serious infectious disease to his marital partner or
to a child of the marriage," would survive even heightened constitutional
scrutiny. 24' As discussed in the preceding section, the constitutionality of a
forced testing program is, in the case of HIV infection, open to substantial
doubt. If, however, it is assumed that the testing requirement itself might
be constitutional (were HIV infection to increase dramatically among het-
erosexuals, for instance),242 a separate question is raised by the prohibition
of marriages involving individuals testing positive. One state, in fact, has
avoided the testing issues discussed above by enacting legislation that simply
prohibits marriage by people with AIDS without requiring premarital screen-
ing for HIV.23
Prohibition is the most "direct" and "substantial" form of interference
with marriage; it would seem, therefore, that heightened scrutiny under
Zablocki v. Redhail must apply. Assuming the state's "sufficiently impor-
tant" interest in preventing the transmission of HIV, it might well be
concluded that a prohibition statute, nonetheless, lacks the required "close
tailoring" between means and ends because risk reduction education appears
more likely to prevent unprotected sexual activity2 than the absence of a
marriage license. 4
This analysis, however, ignores the argument that the right to marry
should not attach at all when one of the parties is seropositive. Adherence
to this argument would render moot any analysis of the extent of the burden
or the level of justification. Professor Bruce Hafen, in an influential article
concerning family issues and substantive due process,2 has provided a
persuasive justification for such an approach. He has argued that courts
should consider the social interests served by a relationship whose participants
240. Dr. Renslow Sherer, the chair of the Illinois Governor's task force that advised against
the premarital screening requirement, has said: "One of the chief ways to limit AIDS is faithful
monogamy, and here we have a system that discourages that very thing." Wilkerson, supra
note 153, at A12, col. 3.
241. Drinan, supra note 13, at 369-70.
242. Texas has enacted a statute requiring premarital HIV testing "[wlhen the prevalence
rate of confirmed HIV infection is .83 percent." TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANNr. art. 4419b-I §
902(e) (Vernon 1988).
243. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(1) (Supp. 1987).
244. See supra note 216.
245. See supra notes 229, 236 & 238 and accompanying text.
246. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing
the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. RaV. 463 (1983).
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seek enhanced due process protection "as part of the process of determining
whether a 'liberty' interest is present in the first place.""4 7
Under Hafen's approach, the only families "deserving constitutional pro-
tection" are those that promote such "ends of a democratic society" as (1)
"maximizing the interest of children and society in a stable family environ-
ment" and (2) "ensuring a socialization process and an attitude toward
personal obligation that maximizes democracy's interest in the voluntary
'public virtue' of its citizens." In effect, this model seeks to reconcile the
Supreme Court's more recent cases protecting the individual decision .to
marry with the earlier cases stressing the importance of marriage to the
social order. u 9 According to this view, there is a constitutional right to
marry, but only for marriages which promote "[tihe basic process of cultural
transmission, without which the traditions and fundamental values of the
society are not passed on. .... "250
247. Id. at 510. It is not unusual for courts to avoid the consequences of more exacting
constitutional scrutiny through the device of determining that, on the particular facts of the
case, the analysis is not called for. In the context of the right to marry, the court in Moe v.
Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 827 (1982), upheld New York's requirement of parental consent for marriages of persons
between 14 and 18 years old, determining that a "rational relation" test was all that was
required, 522 F. Supp. at 629, because of the "power to adjust minors' constitutional rights."
533 F. Supp. at 628. In the related area of sexual *privacy, in a case upholding the Navy's
policy of discharging homosexuals, then-circuit court Judge Anthony Kennedy was willing to
assume that the right to homosexual intimacy might be an aspect of the right to privacy, Belier
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980), but concluded that homosexual conduct was
entitled to less protection in the context of military service.
A similar approach has been taken, in fact, with respect to the marital rights of persons with
AIDS. In Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987), recon-
sideration denied, 70 N.Y.2d 1002, 521 N.E.2d 446, 526 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1988), the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that the state's corrections department could deny conjugal visits to
prisoners with AIDS, even though such visits are permitted other prisoners. Despite the Supreme
Court's decision recognizing inmates' right to marry, see Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254
(1987), the court of appeals reasoned that the restriction was constitutional under the relaxed
protection accorded prisoners' constitutional rights. See Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d at 52-54, 518
N.E.2d at 539-40, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87. The court did not consider the question of whether
the right to marry might be inapplicable because of the prisoner's condition.
248. Hafen, supra note 246, at 558-59.
249. The Washington Supreme Court drew upon such an analysis in upholding the state's
refusal to permit marriages by same-sex couples. The court stated:
Although . married persons are not required to have children .... marriage is
so clearly related to the public interest in affording a favorable environment for
the growth of children that we are unable to say that there is not a rational basis
upon which the state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the legal
union of one man and one woman.
Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 264, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1974). Although the Singer
court had been content to rest its conclusion-that the right to marry was not implicated in
the case-on the observation that "the relationship which is described by the term 'marriage'.
is the legal union of one man and one woman," id. at 1191, the court relied on the above
analysis in determining that the prohibition on same-sex marriages did not violate the equal
protection clause. Id. at 1195-97.
250. Hafen, supra note 246, at 478.
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Implicit within this model is the assumption that procreation and the
raising of children are the elements essential to marriage that support its
special constitutional status. Thus, according to the procreational model,
relationships which would be inappropriate social arrangements for the
rearing of children or which, by their very nature, must remain childless,
cannot call upon the protection that the Constitution affords marriages. 25'
According to this model, a relationship involving one or more individuals
infected with HIV would necessarily fall outside the right to marry. Such a
relationship must either find physical expression in sexual activity which is
nonprocreative, 212 or risk the transmission of a life-threatening virus to the
couple's offspring. 2"1 In either event, the relationship cannot promote the
goal of socialization of children.
In like measure, this model permits states to continue to deny marriage
licenses to homosexuals 254 and transsexuals. 2 5 It might also preserve the
result in Reynolds v. United States, if non-monogamous relationships were
deemed to be "unstable social patterns that threatened children's develop-
mental environments.' '2S6 Such a limitation of the right to marry is also
consistent with the earliest cases that applied substantive due process pro-
tection to family decision-making. 257 Those cases explicitly linked the right
251. See, e.g., id. at 559. "The extent to which an asserted legal interest may further the
ends of a democratic society should be weighed, in the process of constitutional analysis, at
the time the Court is determining whether the nature of the interest qualifies it for the protection
of heightened scrutiny." Id. (emphasis added).
252. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
253. For a discussion of the perinatal transmission of HIV, see Friedland & Klein, supra
note 75, at 1130-31.
254. For a discussion of the caselaw upholding restrictions against same-sex marriages, see
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United
States, 30 HAsru~os L.J. 799, 874-78 (1979); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82
YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
255. See Note, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma,
7 CONN. L. REv. 288, 316-24 (1975); Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery,
and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 963, 1003-08 (1971); Note, Transsexuals in Limbo: The
Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REv. 236, 244-47 (1971). Cf. Taitz, The Law
Relating to the Consummation of Marriage Where One of the Spouses is a Post-Operative
Transsexual, 15 ANoWo-Axm. L. Rv. 141 (1986) (discussing English case law holding that a
marriage involving post-operative transsexual is void).
256. Hafen, supra note 246, at 476. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167-68
(1878) (jury could properly be instructed to consider consequences of polygamy on innocent
children). For a discussion of Reynolds and the Supreme Court's other polygamy cases, see
Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. Rav. 806, 822-25 (1958); Linford,
The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. Rv. 308, 331-66 (1965); Noonan,
The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U.L. Rav. 255, 255-56 (1973); Zuchman and
Fox, Ferment in Divorce Legislation, 12 J. F s. L. 515, 518-21 (1972-73); Comment, Reaching
Equal Protection Under Law: Alternative Forms of Family and the Changing Face of Monog-
amous Marriage, 1975 DT. C.L. REv. 95, 98-101.
257. See Hafen, supra note 246, at 475; Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1281; notes
172-73 and accompanying text.
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of parents to direct their children's upbringing to "the high duty to recognize
and prepare [them) for additional obligations.' '25
This limitation of the right to marry permits the Court to withhold
analogous due process protection from other living arrangements that do
not encompass the attributes deemed essential to constitutionally protected
relationships. Thus, a group of college students who decide to live together
as a domestic unit have no liberty interest sufficient to overcome the police
power of communities to zone for family residential areas,259 and the Court
is correct in finding "[n]o connection" between the right to marital privacy
and a right to engage in homosexual intimacy.mO Simply put, the Hafen
model asserts that the right to marry is not grounded in some larger concept
of "freedom of choice," in personal relationships261 but in the function of
marriage in the bearing and raising of children; an individual "has a right
to marry and establish a home in order to bring up children.' '262
It should be stated at the outset, however, that even if the procreational
model provides a valid rationale for encouraging marriage by granting it a
preferential status, it does not necessarily follow that the model should also
be used to limit the substantive scope of the right to marry. Professor Hafen
258. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (parent's natural duty to educate its child corresponds to parent's right of
control). The Court has continued to emphasize this parental role. See, e.g., Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion). Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (right of Amish parents to withdraw children from formal education after age
16 protected under the free exercise clause).
259. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See Jensen, From Belle Terre to
East Cleveland: Zoning, the Family, and the Right of Privacy, 13 FAI. L.Q. 1 (1979); Note,
Developments, supra note 118, at 1281-82.
260. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). Cf. Note,
Developments, supra note 118, at 1282 (discussing Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for
Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), summarily aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)).
261. A number of commentators have assumed this to be the basis of the right to marry.
See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625 (1980); Note,
Developments, supra note 118, at 1311. However, the Supreme Court's privacy cases have
continued to emphasize the theme of "family privacy," see generally Eichbaum, Towards an
Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy,
14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979) (Court favors concept of family privacy over that of
autonomy privacy), with the Court giving "almost no encouragement" to those who would
read a broader libertarian tradition into the right to privacy. Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the
Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 98 (Summer 1980).
262. E. RUBIN, supra note 3.4, at 18 (emphasis added). On a somewhat more extreme view,
a real marriage can not exist without the capacity for childbirth. Thus, in Mirizio v. Mirizio,
242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926), the court dismissed a woman's action for abandonment and
spousal support, accepting the defense that the woman had refused to consummate the marriage.
The court reasoned that "the mere fact that the law provides that physical incapacity for sexual
relationship shall be ground for annulling a marriage is of itself a sufficient indication of the
public policy that such relationship shall exist with the result and for the purpose of begetting
offspring." Id. at 81, 150 N.E. at 607.
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argues persuasively that the family is "an integral part" of the constitutional
system' 3 and thereby justifies the special status that the state continues to
accord marriage. Jobst, for example, certainly relied on the traditionally
important social functions of marriage to conclude that marital status should
not be regarded as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. 2-
To accept Jobst and its reaffirmance in Zablocki, however, is quite different
from concluding that the right to marry, which Zablocki read out of the
Court's previous privacy decisions, 20 should be limited to only those mar-
riages which advance the procreational model.
Professor Hafen correctly recognized that the preferential treatment of
marriage implicates a privacy-based right to marry,2"6 since governmental
favoring of marriage in some measure interferes with the freedom to decide
whether to marry.26 7 In distinguishing Jobst, however, Zablocki concluded
that such interference simply does not burden the right sufficiently to warrant
an application of heightened scrutiny.2" Nowhere does the Zablocki Court
so much as suggest that government regulations that truly do burden the
decision to marry might escape heightened constitutional scrutiny if the
marriage contemplated was not "traditional" or "procreational."
It should also be noted that the result in Zablocki itself might have been
different under a right to marry grounded in a procreational model of
marriage. Zablocki overturned a Wisconsin statute that prohibited a marriage
license applicant from acquiring a license without court approval if he or
she was behind in child support payments." Thus, the statute was arguably
aimed at making sure that those entering marriage-with its potential for
procreation-had lived up to earlier procreational obligations to provide
support.
It should also not be assumed that grounding the right to marry in a
rationale different than the procreational model would necessarily demand
constitutional protection for homosexual or polygamous marriages. In
the view of some courts, the right to marry is not implicated at all
when homosexual marriages are legally recognized, since marriage, by
263. Hafen, supra note 246, at 480 (quoting Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees:
Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. Rv. 765, 772-73 (1973)).
264. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977). After noting that classifications based
on race or religion are highly suspect because they could not rationally justify a difference in
social security benefits, the Court stated that "a distinction between married persons and
unmarried persons is of a different character." Id. The Court reasoned as follows:
Both tradition and common experience support the conclusion that marriage is an
event which normally marks an important change in economic status. Traditionally,
the event not only creates a new family with attendant new responsibilities, but
also modifies the pre-existing relationships between the bride and groom and their
respective families.
265. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 246, at 485.
267. See Drinan, supra note 13, at 364.
268. Hafen, supra note 246, at 509-10.
269. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-91.
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definition, can exist only between a man and a woman.2 7 0 If the definition
of marriage is thought to necessarily include the element of "the union
of one man and one woman, '2 7' polygamous arrangements are similarly
unprotected. 272 Moreover, even if same-sex or multiple-partner arrange-
ments are conceded to fall within the right to marry, it may be possible
to construct an "important state interest" argument for allowing prohi-
bitions on those alternative forms to stand.27
270. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia, and Black's Law
Dictionary); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311 n.1, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 n.1 (1971), appeal
dismissed 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (citing Webster's Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary).
271. Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Marriage Rights-Homosexuals and Transsexuals,
8 AKRON L. REv. 369, 369 (1975).
272. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), may be read to support the proposition
that "the family in our law is the monogamous family." E. RuBIm, supra note 34, at 16. How
legitimate or realistic such a definition of marriage is, however, may be open to dispute. See,
e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 25-26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). In
Cleveland, the majority held that the prohibition in the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 398, prohibited
the transportation in interstate commerce of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution
or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." Id. at 16. The Act was violated by the
transporting of a woman to live in a polygamous marriage. Id. at 18. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Murphy argued that, rather than being in the same category with prostitution or
"debauchery," polygamous marriages were nonetheless marriages and therefore qualitatively
different:
There are four fundamental forms of marriage: (1) monogamy; (2) polygyny, or
one man with several wives; (3) polyandry, or one woman with several husbands;
and (4) group marriage. The term "polygamy"'covers both polygyny and polyandry.
Thus we are dealing here with polygyny, one of the basic forms of marriage.
Historically, its use has far exceeded that of any other form. It was quite common
among ancient civilizations and was referred to many times by the writers of the
Old Testament; even today it is to be found frequently among certain pagan and
non-Christian peoples of the world. We must recognize, then, that polygyny, like
other forms of marriage, is basically a cultural institution rooted deeply in the
religious beliefs and social mores of those societies in which it appears. It is equally
true that the beliefs and mores of the dominant culture of the contemporary world
condemn the practice as immoral and substitute monogamy in its place. To those
beliefs and mores I subscribe, but that does not alter the fact that polygyny is a
form of marriage built upon a set of social and moral principles. It must be
recognized and treated as such.
329 U.S. 14, 25-26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
273. The Supreme Court has tended to assume polygamy to be "per se disruptive of the
social order." Drinan, supra note 13, at 361 (emphasis added). The Court has even gone so
far as to assert that the promotion of polygamy "is, in a measure, a return to barbarism ......
Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890). The Court in Reynolds stated the
argument as follows:
[Alccording as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the
principles on which the government of the people to a great or less extent, rests.
Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when
applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that
[Vol. 38:87
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If presumably undesirable hypothetical results, such as constitutionally
protected polygamy, are not to be given much weight in support of a model
for the right to marry based on procreation and childrearing, perhaps it is
also unfair to accord too much weight on the other side to the "parade of
horribles" such a model might permit. Although the Constitution clearly
does not impose the requirement that states may only grant marriage licenses
to couples that "have a proved capacity or declared willingness to procre-
ate, ' 274 it is, nonetheless, unsettling to conclude that a state legislature could
decide, with only the deferential rational basis test as a limitation, to
proscribe marriage between octogenarians. 2"
Certainly, it would be unfair to dismiss the Hafen model merely on the
slim possibility that some legislature would decide to enact such a prohibition;
judicial review is not a necessary safeguard when majoritarian sentiment can
swiftly extract a remedy from the popularly elected branch.27 6 What may be
a much more important difficulty with the Hafen model of the "right to
marry," however, is that it fails to comport with the way in which a great
many individuals, apparently including the Justices of the Supreme Court,2 77
view "the essence and purpose of modern marriage.''278
The fact that most marriages produce children does not make it an essential
element to marriage.2 9 Most observers would certainly not view the octo-
genarian couple as being incapable of a real marriage. For many Americans,
the chief purpose of marriage is not procreation and childrearing, but the
opportunity for sustained affection, companionship, and sexual intimacy.6 0
principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.
98 U.S. at 165-66.
It has also been asserted that the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex unions can be justified
as "the least 'drastic means' of advancing the state's compelling interest in protecting and
fostering the marriage institution." Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 541, 543 (1985) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
According to Buchanan, permitting homosexual marriage would require "a dramatic revision
of the concept of marriage as it has been traditionally understood by society." Id. at 560. Such
a "fundamental change," Buchanan reasons, "has a significant capacity to threaten the
standards . . . that the majority wishes to preserve in relation to that institution." Id.
274. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 313, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). Disposing of the argument that it "must read such condition into the
[marriage] statute if same-sex marriages are to be prohibited," the Baker court observed that
'abstract symmetry' is not demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 313-14, 191
N.W.2d at 187 (quoting Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914)).
275. See Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1282.
276. The Supreme Court, in one of its most celebrated statements concerning the appropriate
scope of judicial review, recognized that the "political processes" will "ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For an elaboration on the circumstances in which this general
expectation should not operate, see generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
277. See infra notes 289-305 and accompanying text.
278. Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homosexual Challenge, 5 ANGLO-
AM. L. REv. 41, 43 (1976).
279. See id.
280. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 1, at 74.
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Childrearing is an important function of many marriages, but the parental
role in raising children diminishes markedly after they reach school-age. 23
Although courts at times have employed language suggesting otherwise, 28 2
the caselaw occasionally has embraced a view of marriage encompassing
even necessarily non-procreative relationships. For example, in M.T. v.
J. T.,213 a New Jersey appeals court considered whether a postoperative male-
to-female transsexual "should be considered a member of the female sex for
marital purposes.1 2 84 In an opinion written by Judge Alan Handler, later
appointed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, M.T. rejected the view that,
"for purposes of marriage, sex is somehow irrevocably cast at the moment
of birth, 2 85 asserting instead that, "it is the sexual capacity of the individual
which must be scrutinized."2 s Because the plaintiff in M. T. had become
"fully capable of sexual activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attrib-
utes of gender and anatomy," she "should be considered a member of the
281. H. CLAK, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 74. The parental role "may diminish further if the
current demand for day care centers succeeds in providing an alternative method of caring for
small children." Id.
282. The court in Baker stated that the institution of marriage "uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children" was "as old as the Book of Genesis." Baker v. Nelson,
291 Minn. 310, 312, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). "The
mere fact that the law provides that physical incapacity for sexual relationship shall be grounds
for annulling a marriage is of itself a sufficient indication of the public policy that such
relationship shall exist with the result and for the purpose of begetting offspring." Mirizio v.
Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 81, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (1926).
283. M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d
1076 (1976).
284. 140 N.J. Super. at 90, 355 A.2d at 211. The court accepted "as the fundamental premise
in this case that a lawful marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial marriage of two
persons of the opposite sex, a male and a female," id. at 83, 355 A.2d at 207, and that "only
persons who can become 'man and wife' have the capacity to enter marriage," id. at 84, 355
A.2d at 208. The cases invalidating transsexual marriages have done so on the basis that the
union in question did not truly involve individuals of the opposite sex. See, e.g., B. v. B., 78
Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
Perhaps the leading decision is the British case of Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A.
1970). Corbett held that "the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth
(at the latest) and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the
opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means." 2 All E.R. at 47. A similar view of transsexuality
appears to be dominant in cases outside the marital area. See, e.g., In re Hartin v. Director
of the Bureau of Recs., 75 Misc. 2d 229, 232, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (rejecting
request of transsexual to amend a birth certificate because sex-reassignment surgery "does not
change the body cells governing sexuality"); Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 382, 270
N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (refusing to order change in birth certificate because "male-
to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males"). But see In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d
813, 817, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (ordering change to a female, name for
postoperative transsexual).
285. M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. at 86, 355 A.2d at 209.
286. Id. at 87, 355 A.2d at 209.
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female sex" who has "the capacity to enter a valid marriage relationship
with a person of the opposite sex."' '
M.T. was not a constitutional decision, but an interpretation of New
Jersey's own domestic relations law.28 It is hard to believe, however, that
the logic of Griswold v. Connecticut would permit an inquiry into a couple's
"procreative intent or potential."2 9 Certainly, Griswold must now stand for
at least the proposition that married couples may choose to sometimes engage
in sex without intending procreation.2" Indeed, some commentators have
read the case for the broader proposition that procreation and childrearing
are no longer regarded as essential attributes of marriage.29' The opinion's
closing language clearly suggests that the intimacy of the marital bond, rather
than only its relation to childbirth, underlies the protected status of marriage:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
This language might have initially seemed merely an "afterthought,"0
when Griswold could be read as doing no more than protecting intimate
decision-making within an already existing marital relationship. 294 However,
287. Id. at 90, 355 A.2d at 211.
288. See 140 N.J. Super. at 84 n.l, 255 A.2d at 208 n.1. At least one commentator, however,
has read the case as supporting the proposition that "the right to marry is not constitutionally
conditionable on the procreative ability or intention of the marital partners." See Sheppard,
Private Passion, Public Outrage: Thoughts on Bowers v. Hardwick, 40 RuTGERs L. REv. 521,
535 & n.61 (1988).
289. See Note, Developments, supra note 118, at 1282 n.175; see also Baker v. Nelson, 291
Minn. 310, 314, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971), appealdismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (conditioning
marriage on procreative capacity or willingness may be "offensive under the Griswold ration-
ale").
290. See Sheppard, supra note 288, at 536 & n.62. In invalidating a statute that forbade the
use of contraceptives, Griswold implied that a law "regulating their manufacture or sale" might
be constitutional because it would have less "destructive impact" on the privacy of the marital
relationship. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Similarly, the Court in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), striking down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples, purported not to decide whether the right
to privacy protected the dissemination of contraceptives. See id. at 452-53. Instead, the case
held that, whether or not the right to privacy protected such distribution, access "must be the
same for the unmarried and the married alike." Id. at 453. However, in Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the court read Griswold "in light of its progeny," including
Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade, to prohibit unjustified "Irlestrictions on the distribution of
contraceptives," as well as on their use. Id. at 687.
291. See, e.g., Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HAS~Nos L.J. 957, 978-81 (1979).
292. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
293. Karst, supra note 261, at 624.
294. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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the "afterthought" seems more significant when read in the light of Za-
blocki's holding that family privacy includes the right to enter a marriage.
Rather than surplusage, the closing lines in Griswold seem to point toward
a conception of the right to marry as part of a general right of association. 295
According to this view, marriage would be constitutionally protected not
because it assists in the inculcation of the society's values into new genera-
tions, but because it is an association necessary to the independence and
integrity of individuals.-
The Supreme Court's refusal in 1986 to strike down state sodomy laws291
makes it impossible to conclude that all activity which might support or lead
to "intimate friendship and love" ' is protected as an exercise of a "fun-
damental right. '"2 Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that decisions
"to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships" are
protected "because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding ...
individual freedom."3100 By including marriage as one such relationship, the
Court has given neither an express indication nor a principled basis for
concluding that only those marriages capable of procreation should receive
such special constitutional recognition.
In fact, one recent Supreme Court case concerning the right to marry
suggests the opposite. In Turner v. Safley " ' the Court rejected the argument
295. Such an understanding would not be entirely new. As Professor David Richards has
observed, one of the Founders, Reverend John Witherspoon, described "a right to associate,
if he so incline, with any person or persons, whom he can persuade (not force)-under this is
contained the right to marriage." Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional
Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 844 n.253 (1986) (citing J. WrrHERspooN, LEcTuREs ON MORAL
Pfmosopy 123 (J. Scott ed. 1982) (1800)).
296. Richards, supra note 295, at 844-45. In his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497 (1961), a case refusing to reach the merits of the same Connecticut statute invalidated
in Griswold, Justice Douglas stated that "[olne of the earmarks of the totalitarian understanding
of society is that it seeks to make all subcommunities-family, school, business, press, church-
completely subject to control by the State." Id. at 521-22 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Calhoun, Democracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT'L. L.F. 31, 36 (1960)). Thus, allowing the state
to intrude upon "the intimacies of the marriage relation" could be "congenial only to a
totalitarian regime." Id. at 522.
For an articulation of the view that heightened due process protection is appropriate to
safeguard certain activities because they are an "indispensable condition" of a democratic,
rather than a totalitarian, society, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
297. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
298. Richards, supra note 295, at 844.
299. Any attempt to afford heightened due process protection to intimate relationships outside
of marriage encounters difficult definitional and logistical problems. See Mohr, supra note 44,
at 58-59; Hafen, supra note 246, at 486-87.
300. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984); see also Board of Dirs.
of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1945-46 (1987) (certain intimate relationships,
including marriage, bearing and raising children, education and cohabitation with relatives, are
protected as an aspect of liberty). Even Professor Hafen believes that one of the justifications
for protecting marital relationships is their role in "mediat[ing] between the individual and the
State, thereby limiting governmental power." Hafen, supra note 246, at 559.
301. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
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that prison inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to marry.
While recognizing that a prisoner's right to marry, "like many other rights,
is subject to substantial restriction as a result of incarceration, ' '302 the Court
stated that "important attributes of marriage remain, however, [even] after
taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life.''303 While one of
the attributes listed by the Court was that most inmate marriages "are
formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated,' '04
the Court also recognized such elements as "expressions of emotional support
and public commitment.' '305
Although the "expectation" that inmate marriages will be consummated
upon the prisoners' release from incarceration differentiates these relation-
ships from those of HIV-positive individuals, for whom procreative sexual
activity is not a reasonable possibility, this distinction is not persuasive in
light of Turner's rationale. Turner seems to imply that the right to marry
cannot be constitutionally withdrawn merely because a marriage will not
possess all the attributes that mark most marriages as important. In this
respect, the Turner decision supports the application of heightened scrutiny
to prohibitions on marriage involving HIV-infected individuals.
Finally, when the procreational model is evaluated as it would apply to
HIV-infected individuals, the denial of the right that would necessarily result
distinctly implies that such a marriage would serve no important social
interests. To state this proposition, however, is to discover its absurdity.
HIV infection admittedly makes procreative sexual activity unacceptably risky
for both the sexual partners and their possible offspring. Moreover, as the
disease progresses, the physical devastation that full-blown AIDS may bring
can also make all sexual expressions of intimacy difficult. Nonetheless, the
experience of a person with AIDS or HIV infection and his or her partner
being cared for and giving care, in itself, can be profoundly intimate.?0 To
assert that such a relationship does not partake of what is essential in
marriage is to lose sight of the nature of a commitment to another for better
or for worse and in sickness or in health.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his concurring opinion in Zablocki v. Redhail, Justice Powell warned
that heightened constitutional protection of the right to marry would "cast
doubt on the network of restrictions that the states have fashioned to govern
marriage and divorce.""7 Justice Powell was uncomfortable with such "doubt"




306. See generally Interrante, To Have Without Holding, 20 RADicAL Am. 55 (1987) (personal
account by man who cared for a partner who was dying of AIDS).
307. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
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for precisely the same reason that his brethren were moved to inject it into
the domestic relations law of the states: 3s0 the fundamental importance of
the marriage relationship.
Marriage is fundamentally important both for society, in fulfilling the
function of "cultural transmission," and for individuals, in providing a place
of refuge and freedom from society.3°9 In ZablockP'° and Jobst,311 the
Supreme Court sought to safeguard the importance of marriage for both
society and individuals. Thus, the Court permitted society to recognize and
generalize from the way marriage tends to effect change in the lives of those
who marry,3 12 as well as to enact reasonable regulations as to the "incidents
of or prerequisites for marriage. 31 However, the Court also prohibited
society from unduly interfering with an individual's decision of whether and
whom to marry.
There are tensions in this framework for a right to marry, and the case
of premarital HIV screening puts the framework to the test.314 The case of
HIV testing also helps to clarify the meaning of the elements in the frame-
work: what constitutes a burden on the right to marry, when is such a
burden justified, and, most fundamentally, why such justification should be
demanded. Should HIV screening programs ever be subjected to judicial
review, 311 the meaning and scope of the right to marry will become much
clearer.
308. Compare id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
205 (1888)) with id. at 384 (majority opinion) (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205).
309. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 74.
310. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
311. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
312. See id. at 52-54.
313. Zablocki 434 U.S. at 386.
314. See supra notes 112-82 and accompanying text.
315. Both Illinois and Louisiana are currently considering repeal of the testing statutes. See
supra source cited in note 154.
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